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defense industry. With these insights, Navy estimating methods might be enhanced by al-
lowing for the validation of the various estimating methods and inclusion within the Navy
estimation process as appropriate. This research examines the methods used by a major de-
fense contractor in estimating the development costs associated with a specific state-of-the-
an extension project. The study, conducted through the use of personal interviews and ex-
amination of project cost data and information, determined that a combination of techniques
was utilized within a formalized contractor- specific estimation process. These techniques




A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 7
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 7






D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 9
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT 9
II. BACKGROUND REVIEW AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.... 11
A. INTRODUCTION 11
B. DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS 11
1. State-of-the-Art (SOA) Extension 11
2. Development Cost 12
3. Cost Growth vs. Cost Overrun 13
4. Types of Government Contracts 14
5. Contract Data Requirements List (DD Form 1423) 15
C. NAVY COST ESTIMATION METHODS 16
D. INDUSTRY-WIDE COST ESTIMATION METHODS 18
1 Associated Program 18
2. Similar-To Method 18
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY 19
III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, PROGRAM STRUCTURE AND
COST ESTIMATION PROCESSES 22
A. INTRODUCTION 22
B. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION 22
C. CONTRACTOR PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES 24
D. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 24
1. Overall Corporate Structure 26
2. Lines of Communication and Authority 26
MOKTEREY, CALIFUioiVi li^ !^a9'S:b-600a
NAv.o .-j_ ::...., TOOL
3. CSTV Project Team Structure 26
E. WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE 29




2. Proposal Requirements Review and Development 33
3 Proposal Estimation 35
G. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AND COST MODELING 41
1. RCA PRICE (Hardware) Model 43
2. Lockheed STAR Model 44
H . SUMMARY OF THE COST ESTIMATION PROCESS USED FOR THE
CSTV PROJECT 44
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY 46
IV. PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA 47
A. INTRODUCTION 47
B. INITIAL CSTV PROJECT COST ESTIMATES 47
1. Direct Materials 48




4. Computer Time and Reproduction 49
C
.
CSTV PROJECT COST GROWTH AND VARIANCE ANALYSIS 49
1 CSTV Cost Growth and Variance Analysis Number One 52
2. CSTV Cost Growth and Variance Analysis Number Two 53
3. CSTV Variance Analysis Number Three 54
4. CSTV Cost Growth and Variance Analysis Number Four 55
5. CSTV Variance Analysis Number Five 56
6. CSTV Variance Analysis Number Six 56
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY 58
V. PRINCIPLE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 59
A. PRINCIPLE nNDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS 59
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 60
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 61
D. FINAL SUMMARY 61
LIST OF REFERENCES 64
APPENDIX A: CSTV PROJECT STATEMENT OF WORK 65
APPENDIX B: CONTRACT PRICING PROPOSAL (21 JUL 78) 71
APPENDIX C: CONTRACT PRICING PROPOSAL (18 OCT 78) 73
APPENDIX D: CSTV PROJECT COST BREAKDOWN 75
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 83
I. INTRODUCTION
A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE
Development of new and improved weapon systems requires technology to expand its
boundaries. The Department of the Navy is a prime requirer of these state-of-the-art (SOA)
technological advancements. However, the budgetary impacts of SOA extensions are often
greater than anticipated. The Navy budget development process does not appear to include
an adequate methodology for determining what extending an existing weapon system
"should cost". To realistically budget for SOA extensions, Department of the Navy budget
analysts should better understand how cost estimating for SOA extension projects is cur-
rently accomplished by the individual(s) responsible for advancing this technology, i.e. the
defense industry. Navy budget analysts can use this knowledge to test the accuracy of the
various cost estimating techniques. The purpose of this research was to gain greater insight
into how one major corporation involved in Navy contracting forecasts or predicts the de-
velopment costs associated with extending technology beyond current bounds.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Given the preceding objective, the following primary research question was posed:
What methods were employed by a major Department of the Navy contractor to predict the
development costs associated with an actual state-of-the-art (SOA) extension project?
In addition, the following subsidiary research questions were considered relevant in
thoroughly addressing the primary question:
1
.
What were the expected costs, actual costs, and variances experienced during the
development of the SOA extension project?
2 What were the reasons for the variances experienced?
3. Which development cost categories had the most effect on total project cost?, i.e.
what were the "cost drivers"?
4. What organizational design or structure was utilized during the SOA project; and
how does that design affect cost management?
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
1. Scope
The research focused on the actual cost estimation techniques utilized by a De-
partment of the Navy contractor in the development of an SOA extension project. No effort
was made to consider the justification or fairness of profit margins or return on invest-
ments; rather emphasis was placed on determining the development costs associated with
the SOA extension. In addition, the study did not attempt to construct or suggest any ana-
lytical models for predictive or explanatory purposes. The basic effort was aimed at pro-
ducing an accurate description of the quantitative and qualitative development costing
methods employed by a particular defense contractor. There has been no prior research di-
recdy addressing the primary research question. Consequendy, the researcher relied upon
personal interviews with key contractor personnel and the collection and examination of
cost data at the contractor site. The results of this study should provide the reader with a
complete understanding of the actual process involved and results achieved by a specific
contractor on an actual SOA extension project.
2. Limitations
The study is limited to the observations and conclusions reached by the re-
searcher on an actual SOA extension project conducted by a Department of the Navy con-
tractor. An inherent limitation of this study is that direct transferabiUty of the data, findings,
and observations to other applications may be inappropriate. The actual SOA project stud-
ied involved the design , construction, and operational testing of a single final product.




The presumption throughout this research effort is that the Department of the
Navy contractor routinely employs a method of estimating development costs associated
with SOA extension projects. No overly stringent assumptions were made concerning the
readers in-depth knowledge of cost accounting, quantitative techniques for cost estimation,
or the acquisition/contracting process within the Department of Defense.
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methodology utilized in this effort consisted of a case study involving the
cost estimating processes employed by Lockheed Missiles and Space Company in devel-
opment of the Control System Test Vehicle (CSTV) project. Personal interviews and doc-
umentation provided by the Naval Plant Representative Officer (NAVPRO) , Lockheed
Corporation, Sunnyvale, Califomia, and the Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, pro-
vided the primary input for the research effort. Additional background research consisted of
examining the literature base thorough the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC),
the Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange (DLSIE), and various publications
and journals.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
Chapter II begins with a discussion of relevant definitions and concepts found in the
literature; such as, what constitutes an extension of the current state-of-the-art; what items
are categorized as development costs; and the differences between cost growth involving
contract modifications and true cost overruns or variances. Chapter II continues with a brief
discussion of the types of contracts used to support SOA extension projects. Generic cost
estimation techniques and methods used by the Department of the Navy and the defense
manufacturing industry are also considered. Chapter III introduces the Control System Test
Vehicle (CSTV) itself and the cost estimating methods employed by LMSC in estimating
the project's development costs. Chapter III also includes a description of the orga-
nizational structure and working relationships formed within LMSC to complete the Con-
trol System Test Vehicle (CSTV) project. Chapter IV presents the cost data collected. Vari-
ances between predicted and actual costs are examined along with the causative factors in-
volved. Cost categories that exhibited significant influence over total project cost are identi-
fied and discussed at the end of Chapter IV. Chapter V summarizes the principle findings
of the study, conclusions reached, and practical recommendations made. In addition, areas
for further research are suggested.
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II. BACKGROUND REVIEW AND THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with an overall perspective of the
environment in which the research was conducted. The chapter begins by examining and
defining relevant concepts and terminology associated with technical advancements in state-
of-the-art weapons systems. The important difference between cost deviations due to
modifications in the basic contract and true cost overruns is then discussed. What follows
is a description of a key project management tool used within the contracting effort; the
Contract Data Requirements List (DD Form 1423). A brief look at the major types of gov-
ernment contracts awarded to state-of-the-art extension projects provides the reader with a
general understanding of the incentives and policies under which a development contract is
administered. The two basic approaches currently used by the Department of the Navy to
estimate development costs are then introduced. Finally, the most widely accepted generic
cost estimating techniques currently in use by the defense industry will be presented.
B. DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS
1. State-of-the-Art (SOA) Extension
Before any discussion, a definition of what constitutes a state-of-the-art (SOA)
extension, must be established. Although, an exact definition of the term is difficult to ob-
tain, synonymous definitions are found in the technical literature. James R. Bright and
Milton E. F. Shoeman describe the process of technological innovation as follows:
ThQ process of technological innovation is a phase intended to embrace those activities
by which technical knowledge is translated into a physical reality and is used on a scale
11
having substantial societal impact
. This definition includes more than the act of inven-
tion. It includes initiation of the technical idea and acquisition of necessary knowledge, its
transformation into useable hardware (or a process), its introduction into society, and its
diffusion and adoption to the point where its impact is significant. [ Ref. l:p.48 ]
Perhaps the most precise definition of "state-of-the-art" technology and techno-
logical advancement encountered by the researcher was given by G.N. Dodson and C.A.
Graves of General Research Corporation as follows:
The state-of-the-art is the state of best implemented technology reflected in the most re-
cently [applied] physical and performance characteristics. Our overall hypothesis con-
cerning the advancement in the state-of-the-art is more precisely stated as the develop-
mental design characteristics, (or related to the advance of these characteristics) repre-
sented in relation to the best that has been previously implemented. [ Ref. 2:p.l ]
With the above ideas in mind, the researcher has adopted the following as an ac-
ceptable definition of state-of-the-art extension: advancements in applied technology,
through the unique combination of known and newly developed technological methods, to
produce a previously nonexistent product. Work currently in progress on the Strategic De-
fense Initiative (SDI) program provides numerous examples of advancing technology
through state-of-the-art extensions. The Exoatmospheric Reentry Vehicle Interception Sys-
tem (ERIS) program ^ under development at Lx)ckheed Corporation combines technologies
developed during previous projects (propulsion, ordnance, structural) with current and yet
undeveloped technology ( advanced avionics, engineering integration) to produce a cur-
rentiy non existent defensive missile system.
2. Development Cost
As stated in Chapter One, the researcher has limited the scope of the study
exclusively to considerations of development costs. It may now be helpful to define
1 The ERIS program is currently being developed for the U.S. Army Strategic
Defense Command ( USASDC) at an estimated cost of $500M. The ERIS program will
consist of a system of ground launched , non-nuclear missiles, whose purpose will be to
intercept and destroy incoming ICBMs.
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precisely what costs are included within this category. Development efforts can be viewed
(within the Department of Defense) as a subset of a broader category of activity generally
referred to as Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E). According to the
Depanment of the Navy Budget Guidance Manual, the overall function of RDT&E is to
provide the capabilities needed to most effectively carry out the tasks required to success-
fully complete the mission of the Navy [ Ref. 3 ]. Moreover, RDT&E programs should fo-
cus on (1) determining what technologies are possible, and (2) applying what is technically
possible, to develop workable solutions that satisfy mission requirements [ Ref. 3 ]. The
costs associated with these objectives are categorized as RTD&E costs. For the purpose of
this study development costs will refer to all costs that are associated with the design and
testing of a new operational capability ^ .
3. Cost Growth vs. Cost Overrun
In a subsequent chapter, frequent reference will be made to the terms "cost
growth" and "cost overrun" (or variances). There is often confusion regarding these two
concepts; and therefore a tendency to erroneously use the two terms interchangeably. Cost
growth refers to change in current cost estimates over a previously established base figure.
Therefore, changes in the total estimated cost of a program should correctly be called "cost
growth". Contract modifications, which are simply changes to the original specifications
delineated in the contractual agreement, are a major reason for cost growth in a contract.
Cost overruns on the other hand, denotes the difference between actual cost experienced
and the estimated cost delineated in the contract; i.e. the estimated costs remain unchanged.
[Ref 4]
2 As will be seen in Chapter Three, the development costs associated with the CSTV
project also includes the cost to produce the single operational test vehicle.
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4. Types of Government Contracts
Although the underling purpose of this paper is not to explore the various cate-
gories of contractual agreements that exist between government and private industry, it is
useful for the reader to acquire a broad understanding of the major types of contracts that
are utilized in support of state-of-the-art extension projects. In general, a contract can be
seen as an offer and acceptance backed by legal considerations. The types of contracts
normally used to support RDT&E efforts (and thus include state-of-the-art extension pro-
jects) are discussed below.
Cost contract- A cost contract calls for the government to pay all allowable costs
involved in executing a given research project. The contractor receives no fee. This type of
contract estabhshes an estimate of the total costs as defined in the contract for purposes of
(1) obligating current funds, and (2) establishing a ceiling beyond which the contractor
cannot proceed (except at his own risk) without prior approval. [ Ref. 5:p. 16-3 ]
Cost-Sharing contract- Under a cost-sharing contract the contractor is reimbursed
for an agreed portion of his allowable costs, not to exceed an established ceiling without
fee. [ Ref. 5: p. 16-3 1
Cost-plus-fixed-fee contract- The cost plus a fixed fee contract is similar to the
cost contract in that it provides for payment to the contractor of all allowable costs as de-
fined in the contract, and establishes an estimate of the total cost. In addition, it provides
for the payment of a fixed fee based primarily on the nature of work to be performed [ Ref
5:p.l6-3 ]. As will be seen in subsequent chapters, the CSTV project involved this specific
type of contractual agreement.
Cost-plus-incentive-fee contract- The cost plus an incentive fee contract is a cost
reimbursement type agreement with provision for a fee which is adjustable by formula in
accordance with the relationship which total allowable costs bear to target costs. Under this
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type of contract, there is negotiated initially a target cost, a target fee, a minimum and
maximum fee, and a fee adjustment formula. Factors other than cost, including perfor-
mance and progress, can also be used as a basis for contract incentive. [ Ref. 5:p. 16-3 ]
Fixed-price-incentive contract- The fixed price incentive contract includes a pro-
vision for the adjustment of profit and the establishment of the final contract price by a for-
mula based on the relationship which final negotiated total cost bears to target costs. Under
this type of agreement, target cost, profit, price ceiling, and a formula for establishing final
profit and price are negotiated prior to execution. [ Ref. 5:p. 16-3 ]
Firm-fixed-price contract- The firm fixed price contract provides for a price
which is not subject to any adjustment by reason of the cost experience of the contractor in
performance of the contract. This type of agreement, when appropriately applied, places
maximum risk upon the contractor. Because the contractor assumes full responsibility, in
the form of profit or loss for all costs under or over the firm fixed price, he has a maximum
profit incentive for effective cost control and contract performance. The firm fixed price
contract is suitable for use in procurements in which reasonably definitive design and/or
performance specifications are known and fair and reasonable prices can be established at
the outset. This type of contract is also suitable for level-of-effort work in which the con-
tractor is compensated for expending his best effort at fulfilling program requirements.
[Ref. 5:p. 16-3 ]
5. Contract Data Requirements List (DP Form 1423)
A presentation of the Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL) is appropriate
here since it will be referred to extensively in subsequent chapters. In accordance with DOD
instruction 5010.12, all government contracts which require data as a deliverable item must
have these requirements delineated in a Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL). This
documentation must state all data requirements that the contractor is to furnish. Some of the
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data that is included are: technical status reports, cost and schedule reports, test results,
technical manuals, design drafts and specification listings, and specific analyses. For many
of these items, an approved Department of Defense identification number, known as a Data
Item Description (DID), exists and must be cited. [ Ref 6:p. 4-52 1
C. NAVY COST ESTIMATION METHODS
Inherent in all Department of Defense management decisions is the obligation to pro-
vide for the highest mission capability possible within the limits of available resources. The
policy on overall resource allocation is stated in Department of Defense directive 5000.1:
A cost effective balance must be achieved among acquisition costs, ownership costs....,
and system effectiveness in terms of mission to be performed. [ Ref. 7:p. 1 ]
Throughout the Department of the Navy, there is much importance placed on accu-
rately estimating the probable development costs associated with all program acquisitions,
including state-of-the-art extension projects. Cost estimating efforts are found in every
phase of the Navy planning, programming, and budgeting cycle (PPBS) as well as phases
within the acquisition process. However, emphasis on cost estimating efforts is particularly
predominant in the planning phase of the PPBS. The accurate estimation of development
cost is an essential prerequisite to realistic budgeting for weapon systems.[ Ref. 8:p.3 ]
The development of cost estimates for a particular program is the responsibility of the
Principal Developing Activity (PDA). At the same time, independent cost estimates are
produced by the Director of Navy Program Planning (OP-90). Finally, the DOD Cost
Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) independently conducts a comprehensive review
and evaluation of both estimates and provides this information to the Joint Requirements
and Management Board (JRMB). The primary costing methodologies that are employed by
these activities are (1) to work from detailed estimates of the cost of work packages to
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derive the overall estimate, and/or (2) to stan from the overall characteristics of the
particular system and estimate the probable development costs by deductive reasoning.
[ Ref. 8:p. 10 ]
The detailed estimation approach is referred to as the Engineering or "bottom up"
method. It involves breaking down the project into separate and identifiable segments of
work. The breakdown is accomplished by means of a Work Breakdown Structure (WBS).
The WBS is defined in Mihtary Standard 88 1A as:
... a produce-oriented family tree composed of hardware, services and data which results
from project engineering effons during the development and production of a defense ma-
teriel item, and which completely defines the project/performance. A WBS displays and
defines the product(s) to be developed or produced and relates the elements of work to be
accomplished to each other and to the end product. [ Ref 9 ]
With the task elements of the project identified in terms of the work breakdown struc-
ture, development costs are estimated using available historical cost data and totalled at each
level. An overall developmental cost estimate consists of a summation of the individual de-
velopment costs of each task element. [ Ref 8:p. 8 ]
The second major cost estimation technique used by the Department of the Navy con-
sists of initially viewing the project at the macro level. Specific physical and/or performance
characteristics sought; such as size, complexity, or performance level, are then identified.
Finally, derived relationships known as Cost Estimating Relationships (CER's) are applied
to the parameters of the project to develop a total development cost estimate. This method is
known as Parametric or "Top Down" modeling. The method (or combination of methods)
used by the Navy depends on various factors including the availability of relevant historical
data and/or the complexity of the project being considered. [ Ref. 8:p.9 ]
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D. INDUSTRY-WIDE COST ESTIMATION METHODS
In subsequent chapters, reference is made to cost estimation techniques and processes
currently employed by Department of Defense contractors. The parametric and engineering
models were discussed in the preceding section. These two models are extensively em-
ployed within private industry as well. What follows is a discussion of two additional
models that are used to estimate the development costs associated with state-of-the-art ex-
tension projects.
1. Associated Program
The associated program method of cost estimation attempts to compare the total
development costs of a current project with that of a technically representative program
previously completed. If the two projects are not completely identical, an attempt is made to
adjust the cost estimate to reflect similarities and differences between the two projects. Be-
cause of the difficulty in obtaining a previous project that can satisfactorily represent the
current project, the associated program method is considered the least accurate method of
estimation. It is most often used to obtain initial "starting points" early in the conceptual
phase of the acquisition process and when little or no historical cost data over a wide range
of programs is readily available. [ Ref. 10:p. 2-70 ]
2. Similar-To Method
The similar-to or analog method of cost estimation closely resembles the associ-
ated program method but with an imponant difference. Rather than basing the estimate on
the cost experience of a single representative program, a historical database consisting of
actual tasks and their associated costs, is utilized to estimate the development cost of the
current project [ Ref. 10:p. 2-70 ]. The following example helps clarify the point.
The use of new structural material for aircraft often requires the development of special
cutting and forming techniques with manufacturing labor requirements that differ signifi-
cantly from those based on sample primarily aluminum airframes. Faced with this prob-
lem when titanium was first considered for use in airframe manufacture, airframe
18
companies developed standard-hour values for titanium fabrication on the basis of shop
experience in fabricating test parts and sections. [ Ref. 1 1 ]
The cost estimate for fabricating titanium airframes was based on an analogous
task previously experienced when titanium test parts and sections were fabricated. The
analogous experience does not come from a single past project; as task experience gained
from numerous projects constitute the historical cost data. In fact, the similarity of the end
products is not always overly relevant; what is important are the similar tasks themselves.
Table I compares the major cost estimation methods currently in use by the De-
partment of the Navy and defense industry contractors. An important point to observe is
that each of these methods have inherent advantages and disadvantages and are used either
singularly or in combination depending on various considerations. Table II illustrates the
results of the Booze, Allen and Hamilton study of prevalent cost estimation techniques as
related to various phases of the acquisition process [ Ref. 12 ]. As can be seen, there is
evidence to suggest that the cost estimating methods employed throughout industry are not
restricted to a single method,but rather, are used in concert with one another to generate a
development and production cost estimate. This concept will be seen in a later chapter when
the Lxx:kheed Missiles and Space Estimating System Description (ESD) is presented.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter outlined several concepts considered relevant in estimating the cost of
state-of-the-art extension projects. A workable definition of state-of-the-art extension was
established followed by a brief look at development programs and development costs. The
imponant difference between cost growth and cost overruns (variances) was then pre-
sented. Various categories of govemment contracts used in the Research, Test, Develop-
ment, and Evaluation (RTD&E) effort was generally reviewed. Finally, a description of the
most prevalent cost estimating methods utilized by the Department of the Navy and the De-
fense Industry was presented.
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INDUSTRY COST ESTIMATING METHODS AND MOST PREVALENT
USE BY ACQUISITION PHASE
EARLY LATE
CE DIE FSD FSD PRODUCTION
PARAMETRIC P S S N/A N/A
ANALOGY S P s N/A N/A
ENGINEERING N/A s p P P
P= Primary Method(s)
S= Secondary Method(s)
N/A= Not Typically Used
CE= Concept & Exploration Phase
D/E= Demonstration & Validation Phase
FSD=Full Scale Development Phase
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III. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, PROGRAM STRUCTURE
AND COST ESTIMATION PROCESSES
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter focuses on the specific state-of-the-art extension project chosen for the
study, i.e. the Control System Test Vehicle (CSTV) developed by Lockheed Missile and
Space Company. It begins by describing what the Control System Test Vehicle is, what it
was designed to accomplish, and what Lockheed Missiles and Space Company's contrac-
tual responsibilities are.The following section of the chapter describes the overall Lockheed
Missiles and Space Company's (LMSC) management structure, lines of communication
and authority, and the specific project structure incorporated during the completion of the
Control System Test Vehicle (CSTV) project. The final section of the chapter examines the
processes and methods utilized by Lockheed Missiles and Space Company in estimating the
development costs associated with the state-of-the-art extension project.
B. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Prior to the age of nuclear submarines, the general understanding of submarine
hydrodynamics was such that even though maneuvering responses were not always as ex-
pected, the inherent dangers were few because of the slower operating speeds then experi-
enced. However, with fleet introduction of high performance nuclear powered attack sub-
marines, in particular the USS Los Angeles (SSN-688), these operating speeds were
greatly increased as well as the achievement of maneuvering techniques previously
unattainable. Extrapolation of data from computer simulation and small-scale models to de-
termine the effect of submarine design modifications on the performance, stability and con-
trol were found to yield less than reliable results. The ability to safely and fully exploit the
22
high performance potential of modem high speed submarines required a full understanding
of all factors influencing their maneuverability and ability to recover from casualty situa-
tions. To this end the Navy desired an improved method whereby data pertaining to the
control, stability, and maneuverability characteristics of the Los Angeles class attack sub-
marine could be gathered, analyzed, and understood.
On July 25, 1978, Lockheed Missiles and Space Company formally responded to the
Navy's request for proposal (RFP number N00024-78-R-5352S) by submitting a techni-
cal, management, and cost proposal calling for the design, construction, and test of a con-
trol system test vehicle and related support equipment. What Lockheed Missiles and Space
Company proposed with the introduction of the Control System Test Vehicle (CSTV) was
the ability to provide a more efficient and effective means of assessing maneuvering re-
sponses to control inputs with an accuracy never before attained. The Lockheed Missiles
and Space Company concept involved the development of a 1/12 scale model of the Los
Angeles (SSN 688) class nuclear submarine. It also included the accessories and support
equipment needed for its operation and maintenance. Government furnished control and
instrumentation components were to be contained within a pressure hull and fully integrated
with all other vehicle systems to form an unmanned, free running, self-propelled and con-
trolled vehicle. The Control System Test Vehicle (CSTV) was designed to operate in fresh
or salt water to depths of 300 to 1,200 feet. The project was considered by Lockheed Mis-
siles and Space Company (LMSC) to be a technically risky endeavor. This was primarily
due to the fact that much of the technology needed to successfully complete the project
would have to be integrated in a way never before attempted. In addition, the integrated
electronics and government furnished computer hardware would have to be fitted into the
confined space of the pressure hull. Furthermore, advancements in technologies of the time
were required in the areas of advanced hydrodynamics, propellers, structures, fabricating
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materials, anticorosion and fouling, and submerged mechanical and electronic component
integration.
On October 10, 1978, LMSC submitted its "Best and Final Offer" proposal to the
Navy program manager (Naval Sea Systems Command) with a cost plus fixed fee contract
( CSTV contract N00024-79-C-5356) valued at $1,799,385 being awarded to LMSC on
December 29, 1978.
C. CONTRACTOR PROJECT RESPONSIBILITIES
The responsibilities and obligations of LMSC in regards to the CSTV project can be
found by referring to the Statement of Work (SOW). The complete SOW is included as
Appendix A. In broad terms, Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Inc., was the prime




The design and construction of one (1) Control System Test Vehicle (CSTV)
2. The design and construction of a set of support equipment
3. The test and evaluation of the vehicle to ensure proper operation
4. To perform system engineering activities aimed at coordinating and controlling de-
velopment and ultimate project completion
D. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
For the Control System Test Vehicle Project, Lockheed Missiles and Space Company
(LMSC) drew upon the management success previously realized by the Lockheed Califor-
nia Company located in Burbank, California (a wholly independent subsidiary of the parent
company. The Lockheed Corporation) and it's highly successful "Skunk Works" project
team approach. Project organizations structured along task-team lines are utilized by all
Lockheed subsidiaries for many of their advanced development or state-of-the-art extension
programs. The CSTV project was therefore a fitting candidate for this project team ap-
proach. The decision to organize the project in this manner was based on an internal
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assessment of management elements seen as vital to the success of the CSTV project.
These management elements are presented as follows:
TABLE II
MANAGEMENT ELEMENTS SEEN AS VITAL TO THE CSTV PROJECT
* Authorized Project Manager, reporting to a Company Officer, full authority for
his Project
* Establish a small and highly competent project organization
* Use a flexible and low cost drawing system that expedites and controls changes
* Keep documentation to a minimum, meeting CDRL requirements
* Maintain continuous status of the project visible to management
* Establish an austere and fully compliant Quality Assurance Program
* Support and participate in post-delivery testing to maintain competence for
follow-on support
* Earn customer trust with integrity and close cooperation and liaison
* Obtain customer understanding and concurrence at the start of the contract on
methods and procedures for controlling govemment furnished equipment and
:echnical data
* Limit project access and the number of support personnel required
The utilization of a project team approach was beneficial in controlling previous SOA
project costs. Lockheed Corporation believes that the small number of people within a pro-
ject team significantly improves management coordination and control. Furthermore, cost
control responsibilities within the project manager's organization greatly increases cost
awareness and the desire for controlling costs.
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1. Overall Corporate Structure
The overall organizational structure of the Lockheed Corporation is depicted in
Figure 1, which also shows the relationship between the Control System Test Vehicle pro-
ject team and the other organizational elements of Lockheed. The Lockheed Missiles and
Space Company, Inc. (LMSC) is headquartered in Sunnyvale, California. Within LMSC,
the Research and Development Division (R&DD) is responsible for developing new and
advanced products that take maximum advantage of the skills available within the corpora-
tion. Ocean Systems is one of the major product lines in R&DD. The CSTV project man-
agement team was placed directly within Ocean Systems. Within this structural arrange-
ment, the CSTV project team was authorized, and in fact encouraged, to draw upon all
three major functional organizations within LMSC ( Missile Systems, Research and Devel-
opment, and Space Systems) for technical development support and expertise.
2. Lines of Communication and Authority
As was previously stated. Figure 1 illustrates the placement of the CSTV project
within the overall Lockheed organization. This arrangement provided direct access to top
executives within the corporation. This directness in communications was confumed in
several personal interviews with LMSC managers involved with the CSTV project and was
considered an important advantage during the entire project. Also of significance was the
authority given to the project management team during development of the CSTV project.
Again, this seemed to be a positive aspect of the management structure, as expressed by the
individuals associated with the project.
3. CSTV Project Team Structure
The overriding concept of the CSTV project management effort, i.e. tight project
controls, and full authority and responsibility of the project manager, is reflected in the















































Figure 1. Placement of the CSTV Project Team within Lockheed
Source: LMSC Management proposal no. D085091 of 25 July 1978
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Reports to J.G. Wenzel, Vice President, Ocean Systems
CSTV PROJECT































Figure 2. The CSTV Project structure and WBS task responsibilities
Source: LMSC Management proposal no. D085091 of 25 July 1978
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hardware-oriented organization keyed to the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS). Major
tasks and hardware elements are grouped based on similarity of content. Composed of key
Ocean Systems engineers and Naval Architects, the Senior Technical Advisory Board,
provided an imponant service for the CSTV project team. The board met quarterly and at
the request of the CSTV project manager, to provide an independent audit and evaluation of
technical and management progress. REMCO Hydraulics of Willets,Califomia, the prime
subcontractor was officially considered part of the CSTV project team. As developer of the
CSTV's pressure hull, it was felt that close coordination and control of this most critical
subassembly would best be achieved in this manner.
E. WORK BREAKDOWN STRUCTURE
A CSTV Work Breakdown Structure was used to control task definitions, work as-
signments, budget allocations, development costs, and the assignment of personnel re-
sponsibilities. It was seen as the master guide for identifying and evaluating all activities
within the CSTV project. What follows is a description of the major elements of the WBS
along with corresponding task identification numbers.
1 100- MODEL ( the Control System Test Vehicle itself). This element included all the
technical analysis, design, fabrication, and procurement effort required to design, build,
and deliver the complete CSTV vehicle incorporating both contractor furnished equipment
(CFE) and government furnished equipment (GFE) items. Also included was the effort re-
quired to prepare and deliver the related disclosure information, drawings, and reports
called for by the Contract Data Requirements List (CDRL). Subelements included: Hull
and Appendages; Propulsion Subsystems; Power System; Control and Recording System;
Navigation System; Auxiliary Systems; and Project Integration and Assembly. The work
on the last task element was completed when the CSTV vehicle was ready for integrated
systems tests.
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1200- SUPPORT EQUIPMENT. This element included all technical analysis, design,
fabrication, and procurement efforts required to design, build, and deliver the support
equipment needed for the full operation of the CSTV System. The effort also included all
documentation, reports, interface coordination, and liaison with the government and GFt
suppliers. Subelements included: Control and Display System; Trailer, Sled; Dollies; Ship-
ping Containers; Battery Chargers; Auxiliary Power System; and Miscellaneous Equip-
ment.
1300- TEST AND EVALUATION. This element covered all efforts involved in plan-
ning and conducting required operational tests, including preparation of plans, actually
conducting the test, the analysis of the results, and the preparation of the test reports as re-
quired by the CDRL. Subelements included: Development, System, and Acceptance Tests.
1400- SYSTEM ENGINEERING. Efforts under this element included those resources
required to analyze and define the systems detailed requirements and the establishment and
control of interfaces. It included defining and monitoring the integration of the vehicle, its
support equipment, and all GFE components. Subelements included: Systems Engineering;
System Safety; Quality Assurance, Reliability, and Maintainability Programs; Human En-
gineering; and Mockups.
1500- SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT. This element covered overall Project Manage-
ment activities including technical and management direction, project controls, status
evaluation, establishment of priorities, assignment of tasks, and other appropriate project
management functions. Subelements included: Project Management; Configuration and
Data Management; and Integrated Logistics Support.
Task elements of the WBS are assigned a unique charge number identified as a work
order/work authority (WOAVA); which is also an element of the LMSC cost accounting
system. This charge number corresponds to the WBS series and is further identified within
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the accounting system in terms of organization number, primary cost element, and resource
code. All budgeting, scheduling, cost collection, and measurement of work status begins at
the cost account level. Thus the WBS is also the primary management control mechanism
for summarizing various project information for reporting or monitoring purposes.
F. LMSC COST ESTIMATION SYSTEM
What follows is a description of the generic process used by LMSC to estimate the de-
velopment and production costs of all projects, including those associated with technologi-
cal extensions of the state-of-the-art. This process is the actual series of steps employed by
the CSTV project team in estimating the project's development costs.The specific estima-
tion method(s) used in the CSTV project along with any significant deviations from the
generic LMSC process are examined in the following section.
The LMSC cost estimation process can be seen as a series of events, within phases,
utilizing the various cost estimation techniques described in Chapter II in an effort to pro-
duce effective and creditable cost estimates. The primary considerations of the system are
to:
* Ensure that source data for estimates are current, accurate, and complete
* Develop and maintain documentation in support of the estimates
* Assign responsibilities for originating, reviewing, and approving the estimates
* Utilize successful techniques for developing direct and indirect cost estimates
1. Pre-Proposal Planning
Figure 3 illustrates the key elements involved in the pre-proposal planning phase.
The cost estimation process begins when a Program Manager is assigned to a new business
activity. In the initial planning phase of a project, the Program Manager will form a com-
bined Program Office Staff and a contract proposal team. This combined team is organized
with clearly defined lines of communications and authority. The members of the proposal
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Figure 3- Pre-Proposal Planning
Source: LMSC Estimating System Description
(ESD) Manual
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organization who are believed to possess the specific skills and experience to plan the
program and proposal efforts and to reliably estimate the projects' development and
production costs. A teaming agreement ^ is authorized if : 1) the capabilities required are
not available within LMSC, or 2) the unique capabilities of LMSC personnel coupled with
non-LMSC team members are highly complementary and afford the customer the best
combination of capabilities required to achieve system performance and cost objectives.
The CSTV project did not require this arrangement as all capabilities were considered
available within LMSC. Requests for Proposals (RFP) are used to communicate the
govemment's requirements for a new contract. Once received, the proposal team begins the
next phase of effort.
2. Proposal Requirements Review and Development
This phase of the estimation process involves a comprehensive review and inter-
pretation of the technical and management requirements delineated in the RFP. Figure 4 is
provided to include a complete presentation of the numerous events associated with this
phase of the process. Only the most essential concerns will be discussed.
The first action, the Proposal Schedule, established the ground rules and future
milestones that are to be incorporated in the overall cost proposal development and plan and
schedule. An important objective of the proposal team is for cost proposals to identify the
conditions and assumptions taken into consideradon during its preparation. This is the fo-
cus of the RFP review process. Its intent is to single out those task elements or conditions
that may impact highly on contract costs. The specific items of consideradon include
^ A teaming agreement is a legally binding written agreement with another company
(outside LMSC) to jointly prepare or conduct marketing research or development efforts
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Figure 4. Proposal Requirements Review and Development
Phase
Source: LMSC Estimating System Description (ESD) Manual
34
the: 1) review of contract deliverables, 2) examination of contract options,'^ 3) review of
the terms and conditions, 4) review of any funding constraints, 5) review of the GFE list,
6) review SOW, WBS and WBS dictionary ( task elements) and 7) review of CDRL
requirements. Depending on project complexity, the degree to which technological methods
will be required to be advanced, and the stringency or difficulty of the RFP requirements,
additional levels of program scheduling and review may be conducted to define more
detailed activities. If required, this phase would occur somewhat after (but in some cases
parallel to) the review phase. As part of the program scheduling and planning task, a make-
or-buy analysis is also conducted. Often this is a formal requirement stated in the RFP. The
CSTV project however, did not require this documentation, presumably because it was
considered a development project involving no follow-on production.
One of the most important LMSC documents resulting from this phase is the
Program Requirements List (PRL). This list contains all equipment, subcontracts, and
software needed for pricing. Also often included with the PRL is descriptive data on all
listed items. These are known as fact sheets, and are put together by engineering divisions
and are used in "bottom-up" cost estimation.The final two steps within this phase of the
estimation process involve issuing quoting instructions and defining pricing logic ground
rules. These instructions are intended to produce consistency and prevent confusion during
the next phase of the process; the proposal estimation process.
3. Proposal Estimation
This section describes the LMSC process for determining and developing valid
cost rationale and estimation. Figures 5A include all of the major steps involved in this
"^ A contract option is a unilateral right in a contract by which, for a specific time, the
government may elect to purchase additional supplies and services called for in the contract,
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Figure 5A. Proposal Estimating Process Phase
( Direct Materials)
Source: LMSC Estimating System Description (ESD) Manual
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phase. For the purposes of this paper, only those steps used by the CSTV project team and
any other essential steps will be reviewed. It is also worth mentioning here that a significant
number of the steps involved in the LMSC estimation process are designed to satisfy the
voluminous documentation requirements established by the Federal Acquisition Regula-
tions (FAR) as opposed to generating pure estimations of development and production cost
of a particular project. Documentation requirements of the Federal Acquisition Regulations
are beyond the scope of this study. Therefore, the process involved will be described in
terms of the steps whose objectives are solely that of estimating development and produc-
uon costs.
This phase in the process begins with a "kick-off meeting where cost input
scheduling, cost/price estimating procedures, and other administrative prehminaries are es-
tabUshed by the program manager. Once these ground rules are established, the actual cost
estimation work begins.
The total cost estimate is composed of three major cost categories. These are: di-
rect materials (and its corresponding overhead costs), direct labor (and its corresponding
overhead costs), and other direct costs. The material costs are further broken down into
three categories and involve the following actions:
A. Subcontracted material and purchased services: This category includes project spe-
cific parts, components, reworked items and test, and consulting services that
are not to be manufactured or provided directly by Lockheed itself. The solicitation
of various subcontractors is done via formal Lockheed RFP's or informal request
for quotations (RFQ). Often there is insufficient time to obtain subcontractor cost
data before the Lockheed proposal due date. Moreover, as is the case with state-of-
the-art developments, subcontractor suppUed materials and the corresponding price
quotations are not available. In this case, Lockheed will prepare an in-house
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estimate based on a quote for similar effort from another subcontractor (analogy or




Standard commercial material and raw material: This category includes standard
items that Lockheed normally fabricates, in whole or in part, and that are generally
stocked in inventory. Raw material consists of material in a form that requires
further processing. Supplier quotations are the preferred method of obtaining cost
data however, often as is the case with state-of-the-art developments, in house
estimation is again utilized.
C. Intra-Lockheed work transfer (IWT): This category includes all material items that
are fabricated by Lockheed itself. The raw materials for these items are carried in
Lockheed inventory and hence are accounted for at actual costs. No material
estimation is therefore needed.
An important step prior to the forwarding of a final consolidated Bill of Material
(BOM) is a process called Price Analysis. This auxiliary analysis is performed whenever
(1) the total BOM amount exceeds $100,000 and/or (2) the rate of technological change of
the project is believed to include significant uncertainty as to justify additional review and
consideration of the reasonableness of the cost estimation. The specific actions taken in
conducting a Price Analysis, including the following:
* Comparison of price quotation received
* Comparison of prior price quotations with current current quotations for the same or
similar end items
* Employing parametric modeling techniques as "sanity" checks, i.e. do these prices
appear reasonable?
* Comparing prices set forth in pubUshed price lists with discount or quantity buy op-
portunities
* Comparison of proposed prices with independently developed Lockheed estimates
(similar-to method)
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The end product of the material cost estimation process described above is a
consolidated Bill of Material (BOM) composed of the individual cost categories. Final ac-
tion on the BOM involves the application of a material escalation rate depending on the an-
ticipated length of the panicular project.
The next category of cost to be considered is that of direct labor. Figure 5B
illustrates the steps involved in this phase of the process.The estimates associated with
direct labor are prepared and expressed in labor hours traceable to the research, design,
development, and production of a particular project. Labor hour requirements for
completion of the work to be performed as oudined in the statement of work (SOW) or
work breakdown structure (WBS) are estimated. There are two basic methods used to
arrive at these labor hour estimates.They are : (1) the Similar-To or Analog method; or (2)
the Engineering or "Bottom-Up" method. The Similar -To method is the preferred
technique. It generally yields the most accurate esdmate if properly executed. However,
this method requires the availability of extensive historical data upon which to base the es-
timate. The CSTV project along with many state-of-the-art extension projects may involve a
significant number of tasks in which little or no similar data exists. Therefore, the
Engineering method is generally used to estimate the labor costs associated with state-of-
the-an extension projects. The CSTV project involved the utilization of both methods,
however much of the labor estimation was based upon engineering estimates. Once direct
labor hours are estimated, they are converted to dollar costs by means of applying (1) cost
standards; and (if appropriate) (2) learning curve theory. The cost standards are based on
relating development and production costs to the specific characteristics of the project (such
as composition, weight, size, or duration) and applying Lockheed and/or industry-wide
statistics as appropriate. In general, learning curve theory states that the amount of time
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( Direct Labor and Other Direct Costs
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Source: LMSC Estimating System Description (ESD) Manual
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performing a given task. LMSC obtains the specific rate of learning for each labor task by
employing the least-squares method of curve fitting to a LMSC specific labor cost
database. Although learning curves may be correctly applied to some projects involving
state-of-the-art extensions, the CSTV project did not include the application of a learning
curve rate. This was apparently due to the unique nature of the project and the fact that no
follow-on production was required.
The final category of cost estimated is that associated with travel, overtime
premiums, and other direct costs not previously included. Typically these costs are arrived
at by similar-to techniques or direct quotations from supplying sources. The final phase of
the LMSC cost estimating system involves a process of extensive management reviewout-
side the auspices of the project team. Post-estimation phase techniques and considerations
are the subject of the following section.
G. OTHER CONSIDERATIONS AND COST MODELING
A series of management reviews are conducted prior to the final proposal and follow-
ing the approved cost estimates developed during the proposal estimating process. LMSC
utilizes a parametric cost model; the RCA PRICE (Hardware) model, and a combined anal-
ogy/associated model; the Lockheed STAR model. Discussion in this section is not meant
to imply that their use is reserved solely for the later phases of the estimation process.
These methods are used to provide credibility or "sanity" checks throughout the entire ac-
quisition process. This concept is illustrated in Figure 6.
As can be seen, the "mix" of cost estimation techniques utilized by LMSC is time phased
and correlated with the project managers view of cost uncertainty. What follows is a brief
presentation of the two methods used by LMSC to provide for creditability checks




























Figure 6: The use of various cost estimation techniques
throughout the acquisition process
Source: Information received during interview with LMSC Etimating Systems
Manager, Mr. T. Castro on 24 September 1987.
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1. RCA PRTCF (Hardware) Model
The parametric model known as the RCA PRICE (Hardware) model is a com-
mercially available decision support system that is appropriate for estimating development
and/or production costs at the subassembly or higher level. It is not appropriate for use
with extremely small component parts. Input into the model is achieved by means of mi-
crocomputer with direct access through data link (MODEM) to the RCA PRICE mainframe
computer. Input parameters include:
(1) Physical factors: component weight in two domains; (a) the active electronic weight
and (b) the mechanical/structural weight. These two input variables are considered
critical to the accuracy of the RCA PRICE output. Additional physical factors
include the volume and/or density of the component. These two inputs are not as
critical to output accuracy.
(2) Qualitative inputs: component empirical data in three variables; (a) the electronic
complexity, (b) the structural/mechanical complexity, and (c) the engineering com-
plexity. The critical variable for developmental projects is the engineering
complexity input; which pertains to the scope of hardware development task and the
skills of the project team. Values for these quantitative factors are provided in
matrix form by the model.
(3) Other inputs: These parameters incorporate idea such as design repetition, number
of protot>T3es to be developed, end units to be produced, production learning
curves, and economic factors for escalation/de-escalation of labor rates.
Input variables are completed for all identifiable hardware items of the system
and are entered into the RCA PRICE model. The cost output received by the model is bro-
ken down into hardware development, production, and total costs. Input parameters are re-
peated and "what if analysis is easily accomplished and thus cost categories that signifi-
cantly affect total costs, i.e. cost drivers, can be identified. Several limitations of the RCA
PRICE model are apparent. The most obvious is that input parameters require that system
characteristics be known a priori to the estimate. This severely limits its application to
state-of-the-art extension projects in that many of the characteristics are unknown or at best
subjective estimates themselves. The accuracy of the output is also highly dependent on the
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input parameters. In addition, the actual algorithm employed is considered proprietary in
nature and thus is not easily validated. One would expect to find significant skepticism
associated with this method of estimation. However, interviews with LMSC cost estima-
tors conducted by the researcher revealed surprising support and credibility for the model.
2. Lockheed STAR Model
The Lockheed STAR cost estimation model is a combination of the characteris-
tics inherent in both the associated and the similar-to models. The primary focus in the
STAR model is the extensive use of detailed databases drawn from a large number of past
Lockheed projects over a twenty year period. Three separate and distinct databases are
maintained and used to generate cost estimates. Depending on the project under considera-
tion, the Flight Hardware, Ground Hardware, or Software databases are accessed to cost
data pertaining to a particular element or task being costed. The estimation model matches
the task and project of interest to functionally analogous programs and historical cost expe-
riences found within the database. Each model (Flight Hardware, Ground Hardware, or
Software) uses an algorithm tailored to its own specific application and reflects the way in
which Lockheed does business. If required, all three application programs can be integrated
to produce a total system cost estimate. The STAR model databases do not include ocean
systems project experience and hence was not utilized in the CSTV project. However, it is
included in the discussion due to its extensive current use by LMSC cost estimators.
H. SUMMARY OF THE COST ESTIMATION PROCESS USED FOR THE
CSTV PROJECT
The CSTV project closely followed the LMSC estimating system process previously
discussed. What is now discussed is the estimating methods utilized in developing the
CSTV project cost proposal. The predominant method used by LMSC to estimate the de-
velopment costs for the CSTV contract proposals was the engineering or bottom-up
44
technique. Past experience with costs associated with similar projects was relied upon
when comparisons were considered appropriate ^ . Often, however, the advanced technical
nature of the CSTV project prevented direct applications and various adjustments were
made in an attempt to improve estimation validity.
LMSC's cost proposal for the Cost-Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF) contract used in support of
the CSTV acquisition contained the following explanations of the development costs in-
cluded and how these costs were derived:
1. Direct Materials: The material requirements for the project were directly estimated
based upon the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) and the Statement of Work
(SOW) documents. The costs were based on vendor quotes, catalog prices, previous
purchase order history, and bottom-up engineering estimates. Common minor mate-
rials (standard or common productive parts having broad applicability and wide us-
age) were applied to direct materials by a negotiated fixed government rate.This rate
is a LMSC standard rate based on historical costs.
2. Material Overhead: This cost element represented the administrative burden associ-
ated with material and subcontract costs in two categories; material and procurement.
Prenegotiated fixed rates based on historical costs were applied to each item.
3. Direct Labor: The estimated direct labor hour requirements for the CSTV project were
derived from engineering estimates made by project team members.Task require-
ments were identified by analysis of the CSTV project WBS. Labor classifications
were made as follows: Staff Engineers, Specialized Engineers, General Engineers,
Inspection, Technical Publications, and Manufacturing Development. Hourly labor
rates, provided by LMSC's company-wide pooled labor rate database system, are
applied to each labor classification total. These rates were incrementally escalated by
cost of living/merit increase factors expected to be incurred.
4. Labor Overhead: Labor overhead costs are divided into two categories; development
overhead and manufacturing overhead. Specific rates were applied to the labor hour
estimates of each category. These rates are company-wide, pre-negotiated and based
upon historical LMSC cost experience.
5. Travel Costs: Direct travel costs are based on the number, destination, and duration
of trips expected to be required to satisfy the requirements for testing and special
material item procurement. LMSC standard costs, based on tourist class, round trip
airfares and government approved per diem rates, were used.
5 These similar experiences in which the CSTV project team referred to included the
Deep Submergence Rescue Vehicle (DSRV), the Summa Ocean Mining Barge, and the
Deep Quest Research Submersible projects.
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6. Other Direct Costs: This category included four classifications to include reproduc-
tion, computer, facility capital cost of money, and overtime premium costs. Repro-
duction included labor, materials, and vendor support costs associated with the pro-
cess of reproducing technical drawings, project plans, and blueprints. The rate per
hour applied to total labor hours was a negotiated amount based on historical LMSC
reproduction experience. Computer Assisted Design and Manufacturing (CADAM)
techniques were used to produce 160 technical drawings. Structural stress and mo-
ments of inertia analysis was accomplished using a UNIVAC 1110 computer. The
estimated computer time for these tasks were based on engineering estimates. The
applied rates per computer hour were negotiated and based upon historical LMSC
data processing cost experience. Facilities Capital Cost of Money (FCCM) was ap-
plied to direct labor hour estimates at a negotiated rates for all categories of indirect
costs. The CSTV project team felt that unscheduled overtime would undoubtably
occur as development and test functions were consciously extended and completed
beyond an eight hour shift. Overtime premium costs associated with this likelihood
was composed of two parts; estimated overtime hours and a negotiated rate to be ap-
plied to these hours. The primary basis for the estimated overtime hours was the
LMSC experience in association with a similar past project combined with the esti-
mates of project members.
7. General and Administrative Expense: A G&A expense rate was applied to the CSTV
project's total estimated labor hours. This negotiated rate was based on historical
LMSC experience.
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter began with a system description of the Control System Test Vehicle pro-
ject. Contractor responsibilities and task requirements were outlined and discussed in terms
of the Statement of Work and the Work Breakdown Structure documents. Various organi-
zational aspects of Lockheed, LMSC, and the CSTV project were seen as assimilating
management policies and the project team structure of technical undertakings successfully
accomplished previously within the Lockheed Corporation. The complex and comprehen-
sive LMSC cost estimating system and the techniques utilized were presented from the per-
spective of generating valid and accurate cost estimates. The concept of time phased cost
estimates and "sanity" checks provided the reader with insights into how various cost esti-
mation techniques are applied throughout the development process. The final section of this
chapter points out significant techniques and considerations used in the development of cost
estimates for the CSTV project.
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IV. PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
A. INTRODUCTION
The preceding chapter introduced the process and techniques by which LMSC gener-
ates cost estimates for its state-of-the-art extension projects. This process was followed by
the CSTV project team with very few exceptions. The purpose of this chapter is to present
and analyze the results of the LMSC cost estimation process of the CSTV project. First, the
original CSTV project cost estimate and the results of the Best and Final Offer contracting
process are compared. The rationale for the revised cost estimates is then presented. Next,
a presentation and analysis of the predicted and the acmal development costs experienced is
conducted. This data is presented in chronological order as was experienced throughout the
life of the project and includes justifications for cost growth and variances amounts. Con-
clusions are then reached concerning the principle factor(s) which significantly impacted
CSTV project costs.
B. INITIAL CSTV PROJECT COST ESTIMATES
Appendix B contains the Contract Pricing Proposal (DD form 633-4) dated July 21,
1978. This document is the result of the initial cost estimation effort on the part of the
CSTV project team. As part of normal contracting procedures, a negotiation process be-
tween representatives of LMSC and the government followed submission of the Contract
Pricing Proposal. What resulted was a "Best and Final Offer" (BAFO) proposal submitted
by LMSC on October 20, 1978. Appendix C contains the Contract Pricing Proposal (DD
Form 633-4 dated October 18, 1978) which was provided as an enclosure to the BAFO
submission. As is evident upon comparison of these two documents, the total estimated
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project cost was reduced by a substantial sum ^ . It is important to realize that some of the
difference in estimated project cost was due to changes in contract requirements as re-
quested by the government. The following summary shows how the total contract values
changed as a result of this negotiation phase.
PRIOR TO BEST AND HNAL OFFER:
Initial estimated cost $2,276,503
Fixed fee 191.862
Total CPFF contract amount $ 2,468,365
AFTER BEST AND FINAL OFFER:
Initial estimated cost $1,659,545
Fixed fee 114.857
Total CPFF contract amount $ 1.774.402
DIFFERENCE: $ (693,963)
PERCENTAGE REDUCTION: (39. 11%)
There were several reasons for the reduction in estimated project costs; and are pro-
vided as follows.
1. Direct Materials
Materials and subcontracted items were reduced by $313,050 as a result of
:
(a) A change in the prime subcontractor responsible for manufacturing the
pressure hull. This change (from REMCO to Niles Engineering) resulted in
a significant price reduction.
(b) An increase in govemment fumished items (GFI) as a result of negotiated
contract changes.
^ The BAFO figures, as will be seen, were not the final negotiated amounts. They are
presented here to provide a complete accounting of the changes in cost estimates which
occurred throughout the project.
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(c) Market research into sources of continued suppliers allowed for substitution
of lower per unit cost components.
2. Direct Lahnr
As a result of reevaluating the engineering process, estimated engineering labor
requirements were reduced by 2,470 hours. Small economies and design improvements
were effected to reduce the projected number of assembly drawings required. An additional
833 labor hours of test engineering efforts were eliminated for being"non-essential" in na-
ture. Total direct labor dollars were reduced from $ 524,743 to $434,850; a difference of
$89,893.
3. Manufacturing
Manufacturing labor estimates were reduced by 4,673 hours. This was due to
numerous changes in the basic development contract. Because these changes were brought
on by the government, for the purpose of this study , they are considered "contract reduc-
tions " and should not be treated as true cost variances or overruns.
4. Computer Time and Reproduction
The expected project computer time was reduced by 992 hours; from $63,414 to
$33,654, a difference of $29,760. This was a direct result of the revaluation of the engi-
neering process and corresponding reduction in the number of projected assembly draw-
ings required. The expected reproduction expense was also reduced by $1,220 for the
above cited reasons.
C. CSTV PROJECT COST GROWTH AND VARIANCE ANALYSIS
As a result of further contract negotiations after LMSC submitted it's BAFO, an esti-
mated project cost of $1,682,819, and a fee or profit of $116,566 was agreed upon. A
CPFF contract was signed on 29 December 1978 and work on the CSTV project began
soon afterwards.
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Despite the thorough pre-contract award estimation efforts expended, a myriad of
technical and scheduling difficulties were experienced throughout the development of the
CSTV project. The initial estimated cost figure of $1,682,819 and the scheduled project
completion time was formally changed a total of six times between August 24, 1979 and
February 12, 1981. A combination of contract modifications and cost variances resulted in
a final actual project cost of $3,979,838. The final completion date of the CSTV project
was March 30, 1982; more than two years beyond the initial January 1980 target comple-
tion date. All cost figures are nominal amounts measured in then-year dollars. This along
with subsequent data was obtained by examination of LMSC documentation generated as a
consequence of actual cost growth and overruns experienced throughout the life of the
project. The negotiation/approval process associated with Cost Plus Fixed Fee (CPFF)
contractual agreements, necessitated the format of the reports from which the researcher
compiled the data. Accumulated costs are presented to the government for acceptance. The
basis for these changes in estimated costs are justified by contract modifications and ex-
pected cost variances (expected because LMSC cannot incur additional costs prior to gov-
ernment review and approval) ^ . Thus a periodic negotiation process ensues between the
government and LMSC with allowable costs resulting.
Much of the data reviewed provided information on both costs and fee (profit). The
objectives of the study limits its relevance to analysis of cost data exclusively. The fol-
lowing table provides a chronological summary of the cost estimation changes actually ex-
perienced throughout the life of the CSTV project.
"^ Actual cumulative costs form the basis for the total estimated project cost and is




FINAL NEGOTIATED CONTRACT GROWTH & VARL\NCE RESULTS
DAlh ACliON MODinCATION VARIANCE TOTAL
29 Dec 78 Start Date N/A N/A
24 Aug 79 Analysis #1 82,925 524,798 607,723
12 Nov 79 Analysis #2 192,986 375,773 568,759
29 Feb 80 Analysis #3 128,876 345,014 473,890
24 Jun 80 Analysis #4 239,817 209,970 449,787
29 Aug 80 Analysis #5 90,510 90,510
10 Dec 80 Modification* 75,000 75,000
12 Feb 81 Analysis #6 31,350 31,350
30 Mar 87 Completion $719,604 ^1 ,577,415 $2,297,019
* On this date, it was agreed upon to modify the contract by decreasing the fee by
$75,000 and increasing the cost by the same amount.
Detailed data (by the above actual reporting dates) concerning CSTV project cost
growth and variance is provided in Appendix D and support all the data presented in the
following pages. Reasons for these difference are worthy of examination so that insights
into the risks, uncertainties, and technical difficulties associated with this particular state-of-
the-art extension project may be made. Contract modifications as requested by the govern-
ment will be identified but not be discussed in length as these estimated costs were devel-
oped by means of the LMSC cost estimation process and models previously discussed. In-
sights into the reasons for the cost variances will be the overriding objective.The primary
rationale for each revisions of the cost estimate will now be discussed in the order in which
they occurred throughout the life of the CSTV project.
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1. CSTV Cost Growth and Variance Analysis Numher One
The first formal change in the CSTV cost estimate occurred on August 24, 1979.




Variance or Cost Overrun 524.798
Revised Estimated Cost $2,290.542
Estimated Project Completion Date May 1980
The contract was modified at the governments request to include 1) the design
and manufacture of a special boom assembly
, 2) the procurement/design of special filters,
and 3) an increase in the accuracy of a specific subsystem. The primary reason for the vari-
ance experienced as of this date was directly contributable to the complexity and
sophistication of the CSTV itself. In 1977, LMSC was awarded a preliminary design con-
tract. Design studies then began in anticipation of a Navy RFP. Because of the extensive
preliminary design work completed prior to the RFP, it was the opinion of LMSC that very
little preliminary design would be required at the time that the contract would be let. As a
consequence, the LMSC Best and Final Offer reflected only a minor amount of anticipated
preliminary design costs. However, it soon became apparent that Navy specifications, es-
pecially those dealing with the tail section design and other technical matters, were not be-
ing precisely meet with the design efforts to date. Further preliminary design work was
needed. Further problems surfaced once actual developmental work began. The complexity
of the project required additional drawings ( from 136 to 321) and engineering effort in
order to adequately define the product. In addition, a number of procurement difficulties
were experienced. The most significant being the rejection of unsatisfactory hull material
from Kaiser Aluminum. Reprocurement of this material amounted to project delays and
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fruitless efforts at obtaining an alternate source of supply. Finally, significant quantities of
highly specialized precision components, required by the CSTV, were fabricated by LMSC
when they proved to be unavailable "off-the-shelf as had been previously expected. In
summary, the following factors contributed to the cost variance at this stage of project de-
velopment:
(a) Substantially more preliminary design effort than anticipated.
(b) Significant procurement difficulties experienced.
(c) Off-the-shelf components not available to the extent planned
2. CSTV Cost Growth and Variance Analysis Number Two
The second formal change in the CSTV cost estimate occurred on November 12,
1979. The cost revision as of this date is summarized as follows:
Allowable Costs to Date $2,341 ,255
Contract Modifications 192,986
Variance or Cost Overrun 375.773
Revised Estimated Cost $2,910.014
Estimated Project Completion Date May 1980
The contract was modified at the governments request to include 1) further ef-
forts to design test and manufacture an additional tail section for the CSTV and 2) an up-
graded electronics package. Since the first cost growth and variance analysis, a number of
technical and schedule problems developed which directly impacted the estimated project
completion costs as seen above. The first problem had to do with CSTV hull fabrication
difficulties experienced at Niles Machine Inc., the prime subcontractor. The time to com-
plete welding of inserts, closures, and foundations was greater than anticipated. Significant
numbers of LMSC technicians were sent to the subcontractor site in an attempt to rectify the
holdups. In the end it became necessary to transfer entire sections of the hull to LMSC for
completion of welding work. Problems with the control electronics and procurement of a
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critical ballast pump assembly was the second difficulty encountered by LMSC at this time.
Electrical wiring changes were necessary after initial hull sections were received and found
to be more densely packed than anticipated. Finally the overall complexity and cumulative
design changes thus far in the project resulted in additional quality assurance, rework, and
continued engineering design efforts. In summary, the following factors contributed di-
rectly to the continued variances in development costs:
(a) Hull fabrication difficulties.
(b) Procurement difficulties experienced with major subassemblies.
(c) Technical problems associated with wiring configuration greater than anticipated.
(d) Additional design work Q/A, and rework beyond expectations.
3. CSTV Variance Analvsis Number Three
The third formal change in the CSTV cost estimate occurred on February 29,
1980. The cost revision as of this date is summarized as follows:
Allowable Costs to Date $2, 859,301
Contract Modifications 128,876
Variance or Cost Overrun 345.014
Revised Estimated Cost $3,333,191
Estimated Project Completion Date September 1980
No additional contract modifications were identified as of this reporting date.
However, a significant cost variance was experienced. Additionally, the CSTV project in-
curred its first estimated program schedule extension. LMSC was experiencing several
unanticipated procurement and subcontractor performance difficulties. Delays in manufac-
turing critical path items, such as the sail and tail subassemblies, were traced to the lack of
required component parts. These events not only resulted in project delays but caused
LMSC to expend considerable efforts in resolving these problems. Cost overruns not di-
rectly linked to project delays due to lack of components, primarily included continued
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difficulties with hull fabrication and unexpected hardware integration problems between
off-the-shelf components (also of which required custom-made connector parts). This
situation required the addition of more engineering and administrative man-hours than
expected. Planned expenditures for material costs were not significant affected. A summary
of the primary reasons for the increased development costs estimate include:
(a) Delays associated with deliveries of component parts; some of which direcUy affect
tasks on the critical path.
(b) Difficulties with connections between components
(c) Continued problems with hull fabrication
4. CSTV Cost Growth and Variance Analysis Number Four
The fourth formal change in the CSTV cost estimate occurred on June 24, 1980.
The cost revision as of this date is summarized as follows:
Qq^
Allowable Costs to Date $3,333,191
Contract Modifications 239,817
Variance or Cost Overrun 209.970
Revised Estimated Cost $3,782.978
Estimated Project Completion Date February 1981
The contract was further modified at the government's request to include 1) a
second tail assembly, and 2) a modification to the existing installed tape recording system.
The cost variances experienced at this time primarily resulted from continuing problems
remaining as of the last report date. These difficulties were expected to be resolved rela-
tively quickly. As it turned out however, LMSC was unable to accomplish this without uti-
lizing significant additional resources. The cost overrun was primarily attributed to contin-
uous subcontractor difficulties which required additional LMSC personnel being sent to the
subcontractor's sites in an attempt to rectify component design and manufacturing prob-
lems.
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5. CSTV Variance Analysis Number Five
The fifth formal change in the CSTV cost estimate occurred on August 29,1980.
The cost revision as of this date is summarized as follows:
Allowable Costs to Date $3,782,978
Variance or Cost Overrun 90.510
Revised Estimated Cost $3,873,488
Estimated Project Completion Date January 1981
No additional requests for contract modifications was reported at the time of this
cost analysis report. In fact, most of the problems experienced earlier seemed to be re-
solved. The variance, as verified above, was the smallest anticipated thus far in the CSTV
project life. However, a relatively new technical difficulty surfaced which caused the con-
tinued high usage of certain engineering and manufacturing personnel. This involved re-
pair, modification, and isolated testing of key components of the CSTV control mecha-
nism. As will be seen, this problem was not completely resolved prior to the submission of
the final variance report.
6. CSTV Variance Analysis Numher Six
The final formal change in the CSTV cost estimate occurred on February
12,1981. The cost revision as of this date is summarized as follows:
Cost
Allowable Costs to Date $3,948,488 *
Variance or Cost Overrun 31.350
Revised Estimated Cost $3,979,838 (Final Cost)
Actual Project Completion Date March 1981
* On 10 Dec. 80, it was agreed upon to further modify the contract by increasing
allowable project costs by $75,000.
No further govemment induced contract modifications were experienced through
the completion of the CSTV project. The anticipated variance was attributed to remaining
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technical problems associated with the CSTV control system. In addition, the costs for the
second tail assembly and computer graphics time for final drawings were greater than ex-
pected.
The objective of the preceding paragraphs was to present the estimated and actual cost
data in a format that would be easily comprehended by the reader. Furthermore, the reasons
for the increase in project costs were provided so as to identify the various factors impact-
ing on cost. As is apparent by observing the differences between the beginning cost esti-
mate and the actual project cost results, these differences are significant. Even with a pro-
cess as complete and exhaustively detailed as the LMSC approach, the process of cost es-
timation in this particular case was an exceedingly challenging one.
In the opinion of the researcher, the value of a model such as the LMSC estimating
system stems not only from its capacity to accurately predict future costs but also in its
ability to enhance the identification of factors influencing it's outcome. It was shown that
the total difference is a combination of the CSTV project's cost growth and cost variance or
overruns. It would appear that several factors throughout the development of the CSTV
project contributed significantiy to increases in actual cost. The degree of technological ex-
tension required would be expected to directiy affect development cost by increasing un-
certainty associated with various task accomplishment. The CSTV project costs appeared to
be adversely affected by this task uncertainty. In fact, by observing the data contained in
Table EI, it is interesting to note that variance amounts appear to be greatest in the initial
stages of project development. Moreover, these amounts decrease with the life of the pro-
ject and presumably with a reduction in task uncertainty. It was seen that extensive
difficulties were initially experienced and that extended preliminary design work was
required. The uncertainty factor seemed to shift away from LMSC personnel and more to-
wards subcontractors. As was observed, the major reason for cost overruns in the later
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stages of development appeared to be design and manufacturing difficulty with subcon-
tractors. Numerous LMSC technical visits were conducted to assist subcontractors in suc-
cessfully achieving key project tasks. Also apparent from the data included in Table III is
the observation that contract modifications occurred more towards the beginning and mid-
dle phases of the project than at the end. This may be a function of product definition and
clarity as more tangible results are realized. To the extent that contract modifications affect
variance amounts is less conclusive from observation of the data. A final factor that ap-
peared to adversely affect development costs in this specific case is that of material delays
of singularly less critical off-the-shelf components and their successful integration with
other component parts. These difficulties caused severe delays in the project, unproductive
efforts to find alternative sources of supplies, and excessive utilization of expensive engi-
neering labor in redesign efforts.
D. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter presented and analyzed the actual and estimated development costs
associated with the CSTV project. Data were presented in chronological order as they were
experienced throughout the life of the project. Modifications to the contract, as requested by
the government, were identified. However primary attention was paid to the cost overruns.
Reasons were then given for the resulting cost variances. Finally, several conclusions con-
cerning factors which appeared to significantly affect development costs where reached.
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V. PRINCIPLE FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. PRINCIPLE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The primary objective of this study was to determine what methods were used in esti-
mating the development costs associated with an actual state-of-the-art extension project.
Lockheed Missiles and Space Company, Inc. and the development of the CSTV project
provided the basis for this inquiry. The principle findings and conclusions were derived
from personal interviews with key LMSC management personnel and relevant documenta-
tion collected and analyzed at LMSC and the Lockheed Naval Plant Representative Office;
both located in Sunnyvale, California. These findings and conclusions are presented and
discussed as follows.
A relatively complex and comprehensive process known as the LMSC Estimating
Svstem. was utilized to predict the development cost of the CSTV project . This process
consists of a series of events within phases. Along with producing creditable cost esti-
mates, the estimating process was used to assign task assignments to accountable person-
nel, and to thoroughly document cost estimates for internal and government audit purposes.
A combination of cost estimating techniques were employed within the guidelines of
the LMSC Estimating Svstem to predict the development cost of the CSTV project . Al-
though the Engineering or "Bottom-Up" cost estimating technique was predominantly uti-
lized on the CSTV project, the associated program method was relied upon to a lesser ex-
tent when program comparisons were considered appropriate. Parametric techniques were
used in the final cost estimation review phase to provide "sanity" checks. They were not
relied upon in the primary stages of generating cost estimates.
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The CSTV project was organized around a project team approach . Numerous
managerial requirements, including tight project control, and the establishment of a single
responsible project manager, were accomplished in this manner. This project team organi-
zational structure was based upon the successes experienced by several Lockheed compa-
nies involved with similar SOA extension projects previously undertaken.
Despite the elaborate nature of the LMSC cost estimation process emploved. sig -
nificant cost growth and overruns (variances) resulted . The final CSTV project cost in-
creased dramatically over the initial estimated costs. This led the researcher to conclude that
the process of cost estimation utilized by LMSC to estimate the CSTV project's costs was
complicated by the degree of technological extension required.
Task uncertainties associated with the development of the CSTV project appeared to be
the major contributor to the cost overruns experienced . Although significant preliminary
design work was conducted prior to the award of the CSTV contract, numerous additional
engineering labor hours were incurred as project engineers attempted to adequately define
the CSTV. These design efforts appeared to lessen in the later stages of project develop-
ment.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Government Officials responsible for SOA extension projects should continue to
thoroughly review cost estimates submitted by contractors. Emphasis and attention should
be placed on whether, or to what extent, the contractor fully understands the requirements
of the project.
2. Continue to insure that contract documentation such as the SOW, CDRL, and
WBS for state-of-the-art extension projects is clearly defined and understood by all con-
cerned panics. This may help to minimize the possibility of project misunderstandings and
underestimation of the costs associated with project development.
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3. Move towards more fixed price contracts that place greater risk upon the contrac-
tor. SOA extension projects appear to be filled with numerous uncertainties caused
primarily by the degree to which extended technology is required. The process of estimat-
ing expected costs that adequately accounts for project uncertainties was not successfully
realized in this particular case and resulted in the government incurring significandy more
costs than anticipated. This also may be the experience with cost estimation process em-
ployed in other projects.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
If total contract cost growth is used as a measure of effectiveness, it is apparent that the
process utilized in estimating the final project cost was not, for various reasons, com-
pletely successful in the case of the CSTV project. This study involved one specific case
and cannot reasonably be expected to fully support any broad based theoretical conclusions
on its own. It is possible but unlikely that the cost growth and overruns are unique to this
particular case. Therefore, it is recommended that further case studies involving SOA ex-
tension projects be conducted to determine if similar difficulties are encountered. The focus
of these additional case studies should be to provide further identification of the factors af-
fecting cost estimates and the means by which the degree of required technological exten-
sion is incorporated into the cost estimation process. Greater insights into the process in-
volved would assist Navy budget analysts and program managers in more accurately de-
termining cost requirements and impacts of SOA extension projects.
D. FINAL SUMMARY
As a final summary of the information presented and discussed in this report, the pri-
mary and subsidiary research questions will be reinstated and briefly answered.
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* Primary Research Question:
What methods were employed by a major Department of the Navy contractor to predict
the development costs associated with an actual state-of-the-art (SOA) extension
project?
Answer: A combination of the engineering ( primary technique), associated program,
and parametric (used by LMSC cost estimation reviewing authorities) techniques




What were the expected costs, actual costs, and variances experienced during the
development of the SOA extension project?
Answer: Details on costs and variances are provided in Chapter IV and in Appendix D.
Significant cost variances and contract growth resulted.
2. What were the reasons for the variances experienced?
Answer: The primary reason stems from the costs associated with the engineering re
design efforts required as a consequence of the uncertainty associated with the
advanced and complex technological nature of the CSTV project. Additionally, an
incomplete understanding of contract requirements lead to unexpected cost increases.
3. Which development cost categories had the most effect on total project cost?, i.e. what
were the "cost drivers"?
Answer: In the early stages of the project, the engineering labor cost to adequately
define the CSTV product was the cost category most affecting the project cost. In the
later stages, costs were associated with subcontractor performance.
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4. What organizational design or structure was utilized during the SOA project; and how
does that design affect cost management?
Answer: A project team approach was utilized; the design of which was adapted from
successful SOA extension projects previously undertaken by other organizations
within the Corporation. Concern over project costs received a greater degree of
management attention than would have occurred if more traditional organizational
approaches had been adopted.
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APPENDIX A
CSTV STATEMENT OF WORK
The Statement of Work describes the tasks to be preformed by LMSC in the design, con-
struction, and test of the Control System Test Vehicle (CSTV) and support equipment.
This information was reproduced from the LMSC management proposal for the CSTV
project submitted to NAVSEA on 25 July 1978.
SCOPE
The contractor shall make maximum use of all data developed and documented under Con-
tract N0004-78-C-5309. All work to be preformed under this contract is generally de-
scribed below:
ITEM
0001- Design, construct, test and deliver one (1) Control System Test Vehicle and one (1)
set of support equipment as defined herein.
0002- Provide interim repair parts, supplies and services as ordered by the Administrative
Contracting Officer (ACO) and authorized by contract modification.
0003- Prepare and deliver as defined on the Contract Data Requirements List.
PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE
The contractor's effort described in this Statement of Work shall be accomplished during
the periods specified below:
ITEM
0001- From contract award through the twelfth (12) month after contract award.
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0002- As specified in the authorizing contract modification.
0003- From contract award through the fourteenth (14) month after contract award.
APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
The following documents of the issues and date specified form a part of this SOW to the
extent specified herein.
MILITARY
NO-794-78-003 April 1978 "Control System Test Vehicle
and Equipment Specification"
Exhibit A to 1 May 1 97 8 ASCOP Test Vehicle Contract
N00024-78-PR-31018 Data Requirements
List (DD Form 1423)
TASK DESCRIPTION
This section defined the tasks to be performed by the contractor and the responsibility
interfaces between the contractor, NAVSEA, and other participating activities. Paragraph
numbers herein are directly relatable to the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) included in
the Control System Test Vehicle Specification, NO-794-78-003 and the contractor's Man-
agement Proposal.
Model Vehicle . Design and construct one Test Vehicle in accordance with the requirements
of Specification NO-794-78-003 and Appendixes 1 through 5 thereof
• Perform Design Studies, Design Analyses, and Producibility Studies to support
the detail design.
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• Integrate GFE into the CSTV design, with specific emphasis on the Inertial
Measurement Unit (IMU) and the Control and Recording System (CRS).
• Generate detail design drawings.
• Prepare a design Analysis Report (CDRL Sequence A004).
• Prepare Critical Design Review Data (CDRL Sequence A(X)3), and support the
Critical Design Review.
• Support internal design reviews.
• Provide technical direction to subcontractors.
• Manufacture, inspect, assemble, and test the Test Vehicle.
• Prepare "As-built" drawings (CDRL Sequence A(X)D).
Support Equipment . Design and construct one set of Support Equipment consisting of the
items listed below in accordance with the requirements of Specification NO-794-78-003,
Appendix 6.
• One control and display system.
• Twelve (12) dollies.
• Shipping containers as required.
• One (1) external power supply.
• Miscellaneous slings, umbilicals, etc.
In support of this requirement, the contractor shall:
• Perform design studies and analysis to support the detail design.
• Generate detail design drawings.
• Prepare Critical Design Review Data (CDRL Sequence A004), and support the
Critical Design Review.
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• Support internal design reviews.
• Provide technical direction to suppliers of purchased equipment.
• Manufacture, inspect, assemble, and test the support equipment.
• Provide interface information as required to facilitate Govemment modification of
the GFE trailer and sled.
Test and Evaluation . The contractor shall conduct a test and evaluation program to verify
that the vehicle, including contractor furnished equipment and Govemment furnished
equipment, performs in accordance with the requirements of Specification NO-794-78-003.
• Conduct development tests of selected items as required to evaluate performance
and reliability.
• Prepare a factory acceptance test plan covering factory-level tests and special tests
for Navy approval (CDRL Sequence AOOA).
• Conduct factory acceptance tests in accordance with the approved test plan,
analyze test data, and prepare test reports (CDRL Sequence AOOB).
• Support special tests at the Ocean Simulation Facility, Panama City, FL, analyze
test data, and prepare special report (CDRL AOOC).
System Engineering . This task covers the integrating activities related to applied engineer-
ing disciplines. This activity will:
• Coordinate with NAVSEA and GFE suppliers to define requirements and
establish physical and functional interfaces between the vehicle, support
equipment, and the related GFE.
• Maintain coordination with NAVSEA to develop software interfaces for the GFE
EMU to assure successful operation of the CSTV.
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Maintain positive interface control between the vehicle and support equipment.
Conduct internal design reviews.
Prepare the Critical Design Review Agenda (CDRL Sequence A003), CDR Data
(CDRL Sequence A002), and conduct the CDR.
Review Test Plans and Test Reports.
Prepare for Navy approval, a Quality Assurance Plan (CDRL Sequence AOOE)
and conduct a quality assurance program in accordance therewith.
Conduct and monitor Reliabihty and Maintainability programs.
Conduct and monitor Systems Safety and Human Engineering programs.
Prepare requests for approval of nonstandard parts (CDRL Sequence A(X)7).
Prepare Quarterly Technical Progress Reports (CDRL Sequence A(X)9) and a
Final Engineering Report.
• Construct full scale soft mock-ups of the test vehicle and support equipment, as
required.
Svstems Management . The contractor shall provide and maintain an organization structure
to ensure effective direction and management that will:
• Formulate decisions and exercise technical management.
• Establish rational priorities and clearly defined responsibilities within each
discipline.
• Monitor and evaluate activities of all disciplines to ensure feedback of complete
and accurate information for in-depth program visibility.
• Establish and maintain a program master schedule encompassing all tasks
necessary for program accomplishment.
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• Negotiate resource allocations with all organizations, document results, and
release authorizing documents for resource utilization.
• Coordinate the evaluation and selection of qualified subcontractors and suppliers.
• Administer all subcontract and purchase effort.
• Prepare Monthly Letter Status Reports (CDRL Sequence AOOl).
• Ensure thorough evaluation and proper authorization of all design changes.
• Confirm the incorporation of all authorized changes into hardware.
• Prepare Engineering Change Proposals, Deviations, and Waivers (CDRL
Sequence A008).
• Ensure the proper preparation and timely submission of all data specified by the
Contract Data Requirements List (DD Form 1423).
• Perform logistical studies and analyses.
• Prepare a list of recommended spare parts.
• Prepare a list of special and general purpose electronic test equipment (CDRL
Sequence A005).
• Prepare a Technical Maintenance Manual, Operator's Manual and Parts List
(CDRL Sequence A006).
• Perform liaison witii the government and GFE suppliers to ensure integration of
GFE Operation and Maintenance Manuals.
• Inspect and test GFE as received to ensure proper operation before installation.
• Provide protection and control of GFE to prevent damage during handling and
storage.
• Provide field support as directed by the ACO under Item 0(X)2 of the contract.
70
APPENDIX B
CONTRACT PRICING PROPOSAL (21 JUL 78)
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< ui^Oa OvtM'CAO rjaacifr 0«—>r».m v Ca«< Ctmmt 1/ o - •«TE 1 I a*sc 3 lesT coir f«; i
Development Qvernead l31.140HrS39I.829 I
M.^nufnrti]r;ny Cn-frPtt^td :lfi,5iQ4Hr; 2a7,flnfi
i
I i !S679.63!^ Q-qTOTtL LAtom oyemHtAD
S S>C:i*>. TESTINO ''ocl>irim( /!•« w> •! Oa I CST COST ($)
TOTAL sprr AL Tesnuo
t S'CCiAL C QUI *••£ M T ai airacf c>Mr(«> l/l*ai*« aa IsMlMI itj
f TaavCu nt 0$fmci cAavf*/ /Of.« aa«afl« an affacAa^ ScwiaiiiaJ I «JT CO»T d)
:S8.30Q
*. »«« DiCm 0« »0*«'»^tNCC 3.§gg,
TXJT>«1. TMAVCL $11.996 ' 9-6
• cOMiuL T *Mrs aaaoii'T
,
I eST COST r«> c
ror,«t COISVLTAMTt
t OTMCa omcCT COSTS I'.xo a, fiAiao 4> 95 .515 I .S-?
ror^t. DiKECT COST Ajta oventitAO j;2 . 112. 496
iCnCa*!. aMO AOhihi ST • t T i vC CarCMSC r«aia % af caar •fmmni Urn*. )i' ,164.007 I 9-9
' i- •OTAuTllIJL
TOTAL tlTimATtO COMT $2,276,503
i« HI 0" »«o»iT 191.862
!
r«2. 463. 3651ror4L ttTimATto cotr a/id rtm om pho^
T>ita pro^eaal i* aHaaitiad I— wa« la couiacttoa vtui an4 la t«apa«a« la fOaacnk^ flFP, alo
RFP N00024-78-R-6352 (S), Dated 78 June 07
a«4 raflarta our baai •aiiaiai** a* of (ht* 4at*. la accvf^anc* anth »• tnairucliofi* la Ortarara aa4 Oia foaOMiaa a>Mdi (atta'BL
-q^' •> C Q •> a.* t ano TIT^CR.R. Mesaen^r
Contract Eatlm2tSiZ.
CO* r i«M




eXHIBIT A . UJ^POATIHC SCMCDULE tbDmcilv. II morm «(>•<:• •• n> •• M«n« tUmwia I









TOTAL OTHER DIRECT COSTS $95,515
MAVC TMt OC»«"TM«»r O* oe»f»it l.»TlON»l. *fl»ON»uTICS »M0 S^»CE »Om>«l$T »tiOm
iSS>Om oearoXMfO O" OCviC* O' r OV» ACCOUNT] 0« •CCO«OS l« COMMCCTIOM WITH AMY
COMTKACT ok SUSCOnTBACT •ITMIM T M< VAST TVCLVC HOHTMS'
0» Tff 4TOMIC En€ACt cot*-
OTMcn covekmmcnt vniMc
'
I MO r/> i^*. (•••I'l' k*M Continuing Audit
TXt.C>MeMC MUXaiA' C* T(H«40I>
/408> 742-5991DCAA. P.O. Box 504, Sunnwale, CA 94-56
iOW THACTT
OO VOU l»£OUIAC OOVt ••«••£•• T COWTKACT riMAMCIHC TO ^t
r I Yt> 5c~' "* '" "• •*•""''' CI] *o»*"cc »»TMt
wrooM tmi J ^•o»o$EO cohtbacti
_Bl-weekJy Billings
jAAAMTtKO UOAMt
OO TOU ""O" «0k,0 AM^ CONTRACT 'Of A9 P«»*
CAtLtO ro« •T TXIl •l»O»O»t0 COXTHACT'
. n »«•
pManVr >ww<c*« (IM « Ol »a*i«ciai rO* ThC SAMC OM SimicAM aOKK
DOES This cost tUMMAHT COMFOHM WITM TmC COST »aiHCI'I.CS SET rOMTM IM AS^M. SCCTIOM MV li'» J «07 } ( t) (2))'
-I
INSTRUCTIONS
1 Tt>r purpei* of thi« (on* i* to provitfr • ttasdard (onaal by
oticK th« ollrror tuoinitt to (He Oovcmswnt • •uouoan' s< ui-
currrd and rstimaird cost ratxl alfac/wd •acvoftin^ in(o>nia<>an>
luitabi* (or detailed i>r»i«w and analyaia Pnor a tfta awar«
o< a contract rotultin( from Oiia on>po*al Ui* ofTaror thall.
under ma conditiona lutrd in ASPR 3-807.3 bo roouirad to
tubtnii a Certiticair of Curront Coat or PrictAf Oaia (»«a ASPR
3-807. J(e> and J-S07.4).
7 Aa part o( th* tpecific uiformauon roouiro^ bv thia fem. flio
offeror must auoniii with thii form, and clearly identify aa audi,
coal or pncinc data tthat it. data wnict^ la verifiable and fac>
tuai and otnerwitc as defined in ASPR J-g07.3(e)) In addilioa.
ne muat aubmit antn Wit form any mforoituon reaaonablr to^uif
ed to eiplain Lhe ofleror't etiutiatinc ptocett. uiciudmr
a t/ie ludcmental lactort aociied and trie otatneiBauctl
Of ot/ier met^odt uted in tf^e etumata lAcludi/if (Itoaa
uaed in proiecung from known data, and
b. th« caai>nc«"c>et nod br offofor ta kt* ptopd—
<
pnc*.
3. Attach aeparotc pa(et if nacrttary and idefitify la tliia col>
umn tnr attacnfoont in wtiich t/ie iniormation aupportinf or oiAor-
wiie relating to the tpocidc cott eloaenl aay be (oiaid.
TO OPPERORS
V>ien attachment of tupportjnf coot or pncing data to ttit form
IB impracticable, the data will be tpecilicaliy identified an4
demcnbed f wii^. ae/ieduiea «• appropriate), and loado avtikabl*
to the Centrscua^ Otricet or hx» ropfoaatiiauva upoa roquoaL
4. T^e formott (or Oie "Cott Elemonu" and the "Proposed
Contract Ctunsste" aio not utiended aa ri«iil rcqut/enaoto.
Thete aay be pretented in different format with the prior a^
proval el the Contracunf Officer if roouned for more eflectiee
aad efficient preaentatten. Ut all other retpecu tiua for* wUl
bo coaptoted aad aubBiitad anthout clMnga.
5. Bv tutMniaaion of ttiit propotal offeror, if aelected for
•etouation. frontt to the Contractuif Officer, or hit aathoe>
iced repretentauve. the rifnt to eiamine. for the pwrpote of
verifyinf the coat or pricinf data tubmitted. Ihoae booct,
rocordt. documentt and other tupporting data which will
periBit adeouaie eyaluauon of aucn coat or pncing data, aloof
with (he computauoaa and proieciient uted therein. Thit
ngnt aay be eiercited in conaectian with aay negouatioa*
pnor to oonlroci award.
rOOTNOTES
// Ejtirr in i/Ma column (hooo nacoeaem and roeaanoMa coaia
which in tftm tud^menf of the offeror mtii prafier^y bo inciMTW^
in fhe eldcimi periorwta rtc e ol fhe conirecl. Phen any of (ho
comta in fhi coiumri ha t^ atfrndy been incurfd fe.d., on e
lelirt caniraci oi chanda orrier;, deecnbe them on an etioched
vuppomng »che<]ufe. tdoniiiy oil aeJea end rranafera between
ynur pimnta, dirtaiona, or organixe<iorta under a c ommon cor^
ml. »rfMch arm incfuded a< other I/tan (he lower of coat fe <h»
onginaf uanalmmor or currant mer<ce< prica>
Z' Ithan apace in eddioan (e ihaf aratlabia in EOmbll A la
re«iired. attach aottataia pafaa aa neceaaarv and idenfi/y in
rhi« "Referwicr" column the aiiacJim»ni m which in#or*nafion
aiMfVOftint if^a tactile coal element mar be found, ^o aiart^
ard tortrtat la praacnbm^ however, tha coal or pricing daia muat
ba eccurere. ciM«ifete and currani. and tna iwa^mont laciora
kjaad in proiecfind from the data ro (he aanmaiaa muat So elated
in au/ficient dmiail to anabia (ho Conirecdnd Otiicar <o arefualo
ihe oiopoaaf. ^or atatv'e. pronde (he beaia uaed lor pricing
malarial a auch aa br wandoi quoiaiiona. ahav eadmalea. or
invoice pricea. (he reeeon loi uae of ovarhaad relet wAich d^
part aifnific^tif y from eipenertced ralea ^reduced i«fun*e, a
p/armed meter rv arrange««i(. efc.A or /uadficadon (or an Im
ctaaaa in labor raiaa tamicipaiad wa#o and aatary irvcreeaoa,
aie, t. Idoniity ar^ attain any coniinganciaa which arm incli*dm4
in (he proooaad price, awch aa anticipated coata of ro/ac(a Mid
dofacdve wor*. or «adcipe<ed (ochnirsi dillicu/deo.
J/ Irtdicata (ho ratee uaed and pronde an appropnaia a^lana-
lion, bhere adraemont haa been reached with Oovemmwit rep-
naiura ol iho edroetnenc Proyida t/^a maihod ol con^uiaii^n
and ap^lic anon ol y^Hir ovarnaad aafianaa. including coal
breaAdown and ahowin^ (ronda and budtlaiary daia *» naca^
aary lo provide a baait (or erafueuon of (he I9aaona0lai\oaa
of prapoaad raia^
JJ It Iho tola! royally coal altered hero la In etcaaa of t2S0
provida on a aa^araia paga lor on DD Furm 7t3. Royally
RaDori) (he fof/owind irUormetion on eech aaoaraia nam ol
royalty or Itcanam laa. name ar«d addraaa ol licanaor data of
ficanae a^roemenf. pa(onl numoera. palani ^plicalion aanal
manfrera. or oihar baaia on mnich die royalty la payatia, briat
deacnpoort. Inclirding any pan or modal nuaibera ol each cory
ItacI Item or componant on which ihe loyaily la payable pan
canlaga or dotlar rata of royally par uru(. uni( price of conrract
llaa\ nianbor of iaw(» aid (o(af dollar amount of rorafde^
fn atldtdan. if ^ocilleally rooueatad by Iba coniracling alllcat
a copy of the ciwtwii licaataa agraatnaiu mtd Idmniillcaiian of
^pflcaafe cfaime of apoc(fic paiania ahail ba prortdeA
^ Proeldo a flat al pnncipal llama maihin eacA ca<a«orr ftr
dicetind Anewfi or anilcipaiad aawrce, quantity, unit pncth
canpetition aa(e(neA aid baais at aalabliahing aourca m\4
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APPENDIX C
CONTRACT PRICING PROPOSAL (18 OCT 78)
ec»«aTiiCMT or eartaic
CDMTHAC7 FttaxC PfOFOJAL
mezKAACS AKO otvzLOPmvm CVTT • <••««• •«•••« Mm. 7]-MrO«
Lockheed Miasilea & Soace Comoany, Inc.
P.O. Box 504
Sunnwaie, CA 94086
LT.ISC . Sunnwaie. CA
Design, Cabncace, and test of a





OCTail 5fJC»l»T10N 3» C3JT !L£»*€mTJ
I. 3««teT n»Ttiw>w m I i»» » t^)f At tlf CeiT rti C»T COITL-I CKCC i'





'7) > M ' ff otwi HOi* «(. ••»wiri»i />«(
roTJ t o/i»5rT au re*i<»i. ' 396, 055'
i. xrtBiac SvOaCAO.^ ' «•«• • X > kM« S4.323I




"^nPD' 15.032 ' 12.539 193 ,643 '
^^nnurr A <;';''--""" :.200 11.322 34.?03
Tgcrj.icoi Puaucations 468 3. . 00 ' 4 . DOO
_S£I. ' 11.002 45.390
M-!T^U^-|r-!-'"«' ,412 ' 9.525 ! 165,343
•Averire P-ate ror,«t ameer l<«»o« 4J4. 350l
.'•O* ;v(*>t>0 'lM«.(> 0««m>»«t M C««i C».«mW 3 •• •art I I t'St • ' (IT :3ST III
Deveioomen: Ov»r?.ea.a 3. 232' ' 26. 941 j 355.473
Man'Jiacrjr'.sg Overnead 15.240 ' 12.392 I 201.250
T^TiL Uiaom OrcjUtCiO 1
k. i>ici*i. 'ij^'aa 'i»«KM»« <••« -••• •> a»m I tJT CO«T fill
TOTAL J»»CL»t riJTT^O





I ':3»»»jl.T»«TtfH. iirr- i»».— »<«) I HT COIT fill
"5 Ta t comtVL Ttmn
I ar ta water C9ITI 1 I •• tmt— a> qi 6161




'» »1 1 oa aaoriT 114.35:
rpr^t tsraut no coir a wo rri oa »aortr *
.
77 4 . 4021
S£R: 26a
Tk«« wi— »«i 1* « Mfciux Iv ^« la canaaauaa aua CfM m ««•«>« la (Vaaanaa A^P. •!•.;
Control System Test Vetucle (CSTV) Program
RFP No. N00024-78-R-5352(S) "Best and Flnai". SEA-02S3V: TVG
• •ta •«n«cii •« «•< «Miraat«« •• •/ iki* «ai*. la aceaMaac* ."H <»>• lflaif%«iiana ta 0»f»»ara axri (Ka F—<«a»»a atiiaw lall—
R. R. Mesjenger
Program Coat Controller




riHIlIT 4 - lUyotTIMO iCXtOULt rifii,. tl ttamt »»«««»|







nvi»mmw Pr#TTmim ^ jcg
Total Other Direct Costs SI. 515
KIIOM «f •oaMCO » <vil« e» 'Qua aCZOUitj oa •tCOaei COHoCCTiOa «tTM 4aT OTaCM aOWCaavCar ••<>«
CO«raaCT oa lUCCOaraaCT airaia rac aatT r«ci.«C iMarat'
•yi til ''^ wo f>r >»«. K«»..i> «.»» ) Continuing Audit
DCAA. P.O. 3oT 504. Smawale, CA ?40g'; /408> T42-S991
11. ••^k Tou acou>a< T»t uta o» *» aove»»«»««r B«o*rar-T • rue 'froimtmct o» t»ii ••ovoico eO"'a«cT»
3! '" ^ «>>( n.. .—w.i^ «.«...». ^<. I Attacited List
go »Ou aCOuiaf cav(aK«(Mr CO»T»«CT 'IMA MC lac TO •«a»oai< T»n aaoaOlCO COaratCT' Bi-^VetKiV Ril ling*
"^ »t» m »0 III r^m »lllll>y > 4U**«Cr •4T»««»'« "^ ••Q«aCl( • 4 »«•«•, r 1 O* f"" SU4a4ar(tO ^04al
i». 30'r0uaO«aOt.a<"C3aTa4CT.r wm >•« «o«a «*i. ntir >>!••••« I l« a Ol a>a»«t4l 'Oa THf IA«C Oa tlMk'a *OaaCAWwtO »oa tT T«i» a»o*asco CO"Ta»CT' __^ Ttt T" »o III •••. I n»w
V 00(1 rail c:tT luiMt^aT :aa«oaa aiTa rac COtr aaiaciaw^S »CT foaTn •• 4t»a. liCTiOa iv iIm i-«ar 1 in ilu>
***
'ft ~^ •« r/l a*. ••aa«>a m> • ««a»ia»« tmf.l
INSTHUCTIOHS TT 0^fe«O«S
I. T>«a aiaaaia a< ini^ (ana la la vavi'a a (iaaaaf« lanaat *t a<i»aia<ma ralatia^ la Uia »«aaiii« caai «f «at ••« fea laaaiA.
vnicn !»• sllawr (uaaiiit la ina 0*'»iaa<aa< • 4aaN>a>T •( uf Vhaa 4tia«na««< •( *aa«anint coal a* pneint << la iiu* 1^
ci^ra^ 4Aa •ftitiffM4a« caat f m>« Miacftatf gMjiaaii**^ laraaaaiiani i* iaiavacticaa4a. iha aaia ««U ba •aactltcatiT iaa««ifia« •ad
• atiaaia far aaiaiiva pv«>*w •«« anaivai*. Pi-«ar la ina ia>af« aaacriBaa f «i<a «»<«« •« »»a>»T»«««). aad iMa* ••ailaatt
e( • caMraci raaaiimc I'as tMa moaiaai iMa a<la«a> tnall. (a \Km CatractMH OKxaa a> aia raar«aa*ta<i*« \i*aM rvawaau
mtm9* ta« caAaitia*«a ftiaia^ ta ASPW i-C07.i. ba pa««ttf*« ta
(uaaii • C«nt/icaia at Cxiaa i Caat ar Pncuic Oaia ( ••• Ai^K
•firt tfliciaTC* avaaawiaiiafl^. la all m^m* •«a*acia taia lar« «U1
•• ea«Mia«a« aod ai»«uia< wtntaai cHaa««.
4. Tha «af<aa<« (« ika *Caa4 ClaawMa* •«« iha '^ i «
Ca»tfaat CMiaiaia* a#a aa« uwia^ia aa fifia naaii*—wa
, .
' « . ., . ^ .^ 1 _ TKaaa laaT •• ai«»aai a< ut tfUlaram lanaai •«» (ha viaa •«•r Aa oa» a4 ti« «.«nn« MC^Mia. f.«i«^ »T <•". «-<.. ..-
, ^ ,„ Ca«««t»., Off Ucaa ii i^^w^ l« ai.„ .«.«».•
o4It^ mm** •«••«•« «!(» tMa la^n. •«« ciaariT lAami/T 4a aacM.
eaai m 9fi«iAf aaia fraaa la. aa<« v*#rA ta v^fvaafa a^tf ra«*
lua* s«« a«Ma*<a»4a la aa^ixa* la Ai^^ }^CT J(ti). In •«ailiaa.
ha atvai taaaiii «iin taia lava* 4iv lAiar^iaiiaa paa*a*aaiT f**
4Mtfa« *« vtaiaia tna aflavoa 4 #a4iMa«ui« pracaaa. tn«tiiaiA<; S. & awftajaaiafi atf Ihta va*aaal 9ti9»^ir. i/ 4ata«ta4 far
4. laa iwaiawmal laciar^ avviaaa aiM tna laa'naaMtical aa^atwatian. 0-UHa la inm Ca«Dactu>« Odiaa*. ar aia aatkar-
ar aaaa* *a<naaa uaa« >m ina aaiiawta laaliaiuif iwaaa taa« raarvaamaiira. ina ricTW la ataaiiaa. far ina w»aaa a<
«aa« lii (maciifv :>aai «i»aaa aaia, aaM rartfrui* ">a caai ar ancui* *ai8 4aaauit»4. inaaa aaaaa,
_ ^^ ^. - .
racar«a. aacwoaMa and ainar tw«*artinf aaia •nica ••II pmf
k. in« c«MM«an«t*a itm»* »T a<la»w la Kia Pacaaia
^^^^ aaaBuaia ««aiua<i«i 1 tucn ca«i a» pricui« aaia. 4iaM«
^^*' vim ina caa^am aiia^a an« 0rair«liaMa waaa laaraiA. TKia
Aiia«N 4a»ar«ia oavaa i( na«aaaar^ •m^ idaitiifv ui ihia cat*
m tna «iiaana«aw in w^lth tna uKarvMtaA taavonint ar
ritni atar ba ••«<ci8a4 la cm»a<iiaa van any nafatia«4
^tar ta caMiraai avaao.
^OOTXQTti
1/ tmimr m imi» tmhtmm iltmmm m9ma»marw tt* raaaawa«<a <aa«a i/ ImMtmtm 'Ma rataa aaa^ an* aaaattfa aa in aii'ia«a ar»<a«4
v«<cM la laa lamiwn »4 itm af(«r«r v<l< im aii la »^ ii»« iaia< (Ian. Vhwa a^riiaiawi haa aaaa raacaari m'K Oariiiiima t^m
in ma •4titimmi •artaMBatca W ma cawraal. •kvn ana a< UM >aa«wa<4a«a • lAa aa« ai la»w»< vneia* raiaa. aaaariaa laa
taaia in mta ca<^ia> >f9» titvmtr aaan laaiai < f a.4.. a* a aaiwra a4 •»• a«>aaamK. ^t«r««a ma >••<*•• a< caaiMMaiiaa
t—imr cawtracf ar cnanfa ar«ar>. aaaatKa maaa an «• aiiaaiM^ an« aaviiaariaw •! r*ar a»a»waa< ••vaMaa. inalwmmt ca«<
aawanma aanaauia. Ja«Mify «IJ aMaa mtm mtmmimt aa«aaaa araaaoasx aM 4*awiw< iranaa ana twoatarr a«<a aa aaaa^
ra<« aiaaoa. airiaiana. ar ar«fl>i«aii«na ^laar a caaaiMa caiv «arr )a oranaa a aaata far araiMariaR a< («• raa«aaM*<4Raa*
<^<. a«>c* ara a»c<»<a< a< amar man lAa tavaa a4 c*a< la am »t lapaaK rataa.
a>t«Ma4 (nwataiiai af ai^aaM mmmmt aa*«ak
1/ // '»• laral wrWtr aaat a)»ar*« kar« (* la araaaa a/ 123*
i^ *ha» —mm la a«M«1«4 i* Ota* aaallaafa >a ttluHI 4 la arwriaa a« < raaarata a^a lat mm OD fmrtm '13, Xarailr
ra«trfra«. 4iiacA raa^aia aatfaa mm mmmmmmmrw «*# imtntlr in Ar#am ma /aiiawnf M»ianna«i«t on raca fa«^a«a iiam a/
mil 'Wdarapwa* eaiwan ma aiiaciviani in vMcn in<a«aia>iaM raradr ar liestaa /ra; laana ««• a««a«a a/ iiranaarr iif »l
• DaaaiKaj m« ••a««<lc caar a< iiiniii atar »a la\a<A Na Maa^ /icanaa a^raaaa ii; aMaiw n Ma tan. «a<an< «aalica<ian tti»l
arm iat^»t i« araacrtaarii naaaiai. ma caa« ar »icin« »»t» wmm maiiaara. ar aiaar fi» mm aotcA lAa nwilr it r»w»»lai trfi
• a aact«a<a, ta^aiara ^td a«fvw, at« ma i imam a /aaiara aaacnviiaa. in«iw«n« aar f* •* in***! ataMara a< rar* cai^
«aa« la araiaciiaf «raai ma aa4a la ma aaiiataraa aawai *a iiarart iraci iiaa4 ar «i ai awi aa ante* ma rmrtlir it mtma^ti «ar>
in »m4llti»nt ammil la mtm»i» ma Caarra«>in« OOicar <a rraiwata <aara«a ar aallar ra<a a« raralir aar ia><i: laiK *nra a< caaMraai
ina aaaaaaal. ^ar ar^avia. arartaa ma »aa<a aaa« lar anaiat llaaai man aar a< laaiiai <a« latal 4milar 4 iiimil a< i«ra<liaab
"arariMr a^a «• ar raatfar abaraiiaaa. aaaa ••iia>a<aa, ar In a««Miaa. II 4»acilical<r ra«<a«<a4 ar ma <aMra«..-.4 alfiaar,
inaarra «r)*r«i ma raaaaa lar ara ml araraaaa raaa* aoir* a^ a eaar a< ma cwraaat liaaara a«/aaaiaa« •«« laauWicMtaa ai
'
••^ ««#n#/iraa«ir Irani ara«rtaM«»« raraa iraatrcaa ration, a acvilcaMa alataia ml —*mili* rmtmtit ttimll ka aranaad.
•"••aa la laa^ rxrr i»Mict*a<aa »a«a ana raiarr incraaaaa. 4^ *«a»»*a a Ilk* a< mrtmmi»ml MaMa wiimin >a«« cara#arr ••
• <«.;. laaniifv ^« ••<•« ^r •aa«in«s<<ir« vnicn rra in- tftcaon* aaaaa> ar swiciaataa riar i a. avaniiir. ••ii amea,
claaa« In ika mt^tmmm^ anaa. *mm mm aniiaiaataa carta al r^ canMariiian aaiaaia* mm* kaata a< aa«a«Ha*m« tmmnm mmt
immim ^t« aaraaiiva ava. ar aM»a«»a*a« laanaiaai ailluw^iiaa. fmmmamm»lmmmmm W aaat.
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APPENDIX D
CSTV PROJECT COST BREAKDOWN
3
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